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OPPORTUNITY
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ABSTRACT
Securities regulation can be justified on a number of grounds, but
furthering the expansion of opportunities for wealth accumulation
across sectors of the population has generally not been utilized as an
argument for regulation.
This article demonstrates how an
opportunities-based perspective, informed by the findings from
interdisciplinary research, could alter securities policy in four areas:
(1) enhancing access to information and financial institutions; (2)
requiring disclosures; (3) impacting the behavioral biases of
investors; and (4) aligning the incentives of investment professionals
to better facilitate the wealth accumulation of their clients. The
implications of applying an opportunities-based approach to
financial regulation are distinct from those of a public welfare or
efficiency approach to regulation. More so than these other
approaches, an opportunities-based approach requires an
understanding of the empirical realities of investor behavior and
yields policy recommendations targeted at increasing opportunities
for wealth accumulation for the average investor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To date, commentary on the role of securities regulation has
focused on its role vis-à-vis financial markets. Academics have posited
that the purpose of securities regulation is to make markets operate more
efficiently.1 In general, the goals of securities regulation – when
attempting to improve market efficiency – have been consistent with a
social welfare approach to government regulation.2
1. See, e.g., Matthew Beville, Dino Falaschetti, & Michael J. Orlando, An
Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 849,
858 (2010) (“[A] wealth of economic theory and evidence supports the hypothesis that
‘free markets’ work better when the law provides a low-transaction-cost
environment.”); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities
regulation is to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of
resources in the economy.”); Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management
Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 522 (2009) (“The central idea behind the
welfare-economics inquiry is that society fares best when markets are competitive.
Regulation is therefore justified to the extent it corrects for failures in the market that
hinder competition and does so in a cost-effective manner.”).
2. See Beville et. al., supra note 1, at 859-60 (treating securities regulation of
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Specific arguments along these lines have prioritized the role of
securities regulation in correcting market failures.3 Perhaps the most
common market failure discussed in the context of securities regulation
is imperfect information.4 The Securities and Exchange Commission
systemic risk as similar to the effect of pollution on third-parties, where regulation is
used to improve social welfare). Relying on a social welfare approach involves using
regulation to correct a market failure, as when regulation is necessary to correct the
financial incentives for industry participants to pollute at the expense of others, by
internalizing the externalities they cause. Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 525
(“A welfare-economics framework can provide a backbone to regulatory analysis in this
area . . . . Free competition . . . may not always yield such a utopian result. If the
market itself is flawed, then it may be unwise to rely solely on the invisible hand to
bring about societal progress. Regulation, therefore, may be justified when a market
suffers from such structural imperfections—so-called market failures. Markets could
fail if they involve[] the provision of public goods or cause[] harmful third-party effects
(so-called negative externalities).”).
3. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 525 (“If the market itself is flawed, then it may be
unwise to rely solely on the invisible hand to bring about societal progress. Regulation,
therefore, may be justified when a market suffers from such structural imperfections—
so-called market failures.”).
4. See id. at 521 (“In the fund industry, the primary market-failure concerns
revolve around consumer fallibility—that fund investors potentially lack the
information and know-how to properly make investing decisions without regulatory
intervention.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 756 (summarizes the views
of proponents of mandatory disclosure, describing information as a public good, where
optimal levels will not be provided by private entities without some form of mandatory
disclosure); David E. Riggs, Robert C. Rosselot, & Melanie Mayo West, Securities
Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Banker’s Primer, 113 BANKING L.J. 864, 865 (1996)
(describing regulation of mutual funds through disclosure as “a foundation of investor
protection” and “intended to facilitate informed investment decisions and to provide
basic uniformity among mutual funds”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH U.
L.Q. 417, 418 (2003) (in order to be effective, mandatory disclosure, which is designed
to solve informational asymmetries and “promote[] informed investor decision making,
capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency,” requires both the actual
disclosure of information and that information being put to use effectively); Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in Regulating
Information, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2007) (“The availability of and access to . . .
information on reasonable terms has been identified as one of the essential
characteristics of strong financial markets.”). The existence of imperfect information
arises in any case where there is not perfect information – where everyone is assumed to
be informed about the entire history of actions that have already been taken. Boğaçhan
Çelen & Shachar Kariv, An Experimental Test of Observational Learning Under
Imperfect Information, 26 ECON. THEORY 677, 678 (2005). A simple example of
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(“SEC” or “Commission”) has long seen its role as an agency that
mitigates information problems by promoting the availability and
accuracy of information.5
In addition to imperfect information, some scholars have focused
on the other market failures which impact securities markets. For
example, some have attempted to model and remedy the problem of
systemic risk, a negative externality caused by the trades and investment
positions of certain financial players in the market because of the
interconnectedness of their own trades.6 Another justification for

imperfect information would be to assume that in a competitive market, sellers know
the quality of what they are selling, while buyers only know the average quality in the
market as a whole. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in
Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229,
239 (1986).
5. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “The Investor’s Advocate:
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation,” http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2010)
(“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive from
a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private
individuals, should have access to basic facts about an investment prior to buying or
selling it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful
financial and other information to the public.”); Assessing The Madoff Ponzi Scheme
and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Financial Services
and Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises,
111th Cong. 111-12 (2009) (Statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Division of
Investment Management at U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts020409-joint.htm (“The SEC is concerned
primarily with promoting the disclosure of important market-related information,
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud.”).
6. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial
System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010) (“Systemic risk is the risk that the
failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly contribute to the
failure of other significant financial institutions as a result of their linkages to each
other.”). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008)
(“The classic example of systemic risk . . . is a bank run [because] . . . [t]he chain of
subsequent failures can occur because banks are closely intertwined financially. They
lend to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other, and make
payments through the interbank clearing system (whereby banks with equity and
deposit accounts exceeding their liabilities can offer these excess funds to other banks
who wish to increase loans to their customers). Because of this interconnectedness, one
bank’s default on an obligation to another may adversely affect that other bank’s ability
to meet its obligations to yet other banks, and so on down the chain of banks and
beyond.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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regulation that has been proposed is minimizing the principal-agent
problem,7 which relates to market failures caused by imperfect
information and transaction costs. Boosting investor confidence has also
been cited as a goal of securities regulation,8 although it is not clear
which market failure this goal addresses.
What is missing from an analysis of the role of securities regulation
is a social welfare justification that is distinct from market efficacy
altogether. While improving the efficiency of markets can improve
social welfare by facilitating investment decisions that increase investor
utility, wealth and investor satisfaction could also be increased for a
significant group of investors by considering policy measures that are
not traditionally associated with enhancing market efficiency. I evaluate
the implications of securities regulatory policy, contending that one of
its explicit goals is, and should be, the expansion of opportunities for
wealth accumulation across different sectors of the population.
Different sectors of the population include distinct groups of investors:
those who are wealthy and those who are not; those who delegate their
7. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (“Disclosure can help reduce the cost
of monitoring promoters’ and managers’ use of corporate assets for self-interested
purposes. The modern literature on the firm recognizes the ubiquity and importance of
such agency problems; moreover, rules mandating particular disclosures are common in
principal-agent contexts. It therefore seems reasonable to consider the reduction of
agency costs as an efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure in securities
markets.”); Paredes, supra note 4, at 462-67 (arguing that disclosure would reduce
agency costs by limiting the need for investigation and enforcement actions as
corporations would limit undesirable conduct if the public was aware of all their
actions, and that investors need to be confident in the markets in order to invest,
something that an appropriate level of regulation can help achieve).
8. Paredes, supra note 4 at 467-70 (arguing that an investor’s belief that she has
adequate information on a company’s activities improves investor confidence in
financial markets); Large Trader Reporting System, Exchange Act Release No. 61908,
75 Fed. Reg. 21456, 21484 (Apr. 23, 2010) (proposing rules that would allow the SEC
to collect information on large volumes of assets or asset value for the purpose of
improving the SEC’s understanding of the impact of large traders on securities markets
and being “better positioned to administer and enforce the federal securities laws,
thereby promoting the integrity and efficiency of the markets, as well as, ultimately,
investor confidence and capital formation”); Short-Term Borrowings Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–9143, 34–62932, 75 Fed. Reg. 59866, 59886 (Sept. 28,
2010) (proposing rules that would require greater disclosure of registrants’ short-term
borrowing for the purpose of maintaining “investor confidence in the full and fair
disclosure required of all registrants”).
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investment decisions and those who do not; those who are well informed
about financial institutions and products and those who are not; and, in
short, those who are financially sophisticated9 and those who are not.
Expansion of opportunity may appear novel as a goal justifying
financial regulation, but it should not. In other areas of government
policy, promoting opportunities for different groups has been recognized
as a worthy justification for government intervention.
Indeed,
promoting wealth through the ownership of housing for the middle and
lower income classes has long been a mainstay of U.S. social policy.10
Politicians have touted home ownership as emblematic of achieving the
American dream11 and have encouraged middle class citizens to rely on
9. A financially sophisticated investor has been defined as “an investor that, either
alone or with the assistance of a purchaser representative, possesses such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment.” Houman B. Shadab, The Law and
Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 240, 258 n. 114 (2009).
10. See Beville et. al., supra note 1, at 856 (“For example, the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 required the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to establish goals encouraging [government
sponsored enterprises] to promote home ownership among low-income borrowers and
borrowers in historically underserved areas.”); U.S. Department of Labor, “Home
Needs of Nation Offer Opportunity for Constructive Initiative,” Information and
Education Service, Division of Public Works and Construction Development, March
18, 1919 (No. 3-17A: National Archives, Washington, D.C.) (“The home-building
problem of the country must be approached from a new angle. The central idea must be
to build well, yet inexpensively, so that the opportunity of home-ownership may be
widened and extended to persons to whom, heretofore, it has been closed. The problem
can be solved by private interests. If they devote their energies to the situation they will
meet the same success that was theirs in the automobile and in the piano industries.”)
(cited in Thomas C. Hubka & Judith T. Kenny, Examining the American Dream:
Housing Standards and the Emergence of a National Housing Culture, 1900-1930, 13
PERSP.
VERNACULAR
ARCHITECTURE
49,
49
(2006),
available
at
http://www.jstor.org/pss/20355368); Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership:
How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership
Accessible to Whites and out of Reach for Black, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 188 (2005) (“Prior
to the 1930s, owner-occupied housing was a good held primarily for reasons of
consumption — not investment — and usually acquired late in life. Through New Deal
reforms, homeownership became the primary mechanism that middle-class Americans
use to build assets. Today, 60% of the total assets of middle-class Americans are held in
owner-occupied homes.”) (internal citations omitted).
11. See Curt Hochbein, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 38 CAP. U.
L. REV. 889, 889 (2010) (“Owning a home has transformed from being part of the
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the value of their home as a source of wealth.12 The policy of promoting
home ownership as a form of wealth accumulation has significantly
impacted the tax code of the United States13 and has served as the
impetus for the formation of Fannie Mae in 1938,14 the creation of
Freddie Mac in 1970,15 and the institution of the FHA loan guarantee
‘American Dream’ to what many people, including our legislators, see as the ‘American
Right.’”); President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin
(July 27, 1992) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21270
(“Part of the American dream is owning your own home”).
12. See Foreclosure, Predatory Mortgage and Payday Lending in America’s
Cities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 6
(2007) (statement of Josh Nassar, Vice President for Federal Affairs, Center for
Responsible Lending (CRL)) (“Nearly 60 percent of the total wealth held by middleclass families resides in their home equity - the value of their home minus the amount
they owe on it. For African-American and Hispanic families, the share is much higher,
topping 88 percent for both groups.”); Alice M. Thomas, The Racial Wealth Divide
Through the Eyes of the Younger Family: Undoing America’s Legacy of Wealth
Inequality in Search of the Elusive American Dream Utilizing a Sankofa Model of
Transitional Justice, 5 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“The residential home is
typically the largest wealth-producing asset for the middle class”).
13. See John E. Anderson et al., Tax Reform and Incentives to Encourage OwnerOccupied Housing: Analysis of the President’s Tax Reform Panel Recommendation to
Convert the Mortgage Interest Deduction to a Tax Credit, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943062 (“Public policy designed to encourage
home ownership has operated primarily through the federal income tax system in the
United States. With multiple incentives for home-ownership, the income tax system is
the main tool by which the federal government encourages families to become homeowners and accumulate wealth in the form of real estate.”); Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse
M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y &
ECON. 37, 37-38 (2003) (“The American subsidy of homeownership is among the most
prominent features of our tax code. In 1999, $773 billion was deducted by 40 million
homeowners using the home mortgage interest deduction.”); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist
Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 550
(Summer 2007) (“[The mortgage interest deduction] makes housing ownership more
affordable because it enables prospective homebuyers to qualify for larger mortgages
than their incomes would otherwise justify.”).
14. See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 154 (2009) (“Even with the
prospect of a federal guarantee on mortgage loan terms, the housing crisis of the 1930’s
continued. In 1938 Congress created Fannie Mae to simply buy up mortgages that met
federal underwriting guidelines and public policy objectives.”)
15. See id. at 156 (“In 1970, Congress created ‘Freddie Mac’ to serve a similar role
as Fannie Mae. By creating a second Government Sponsored Enterprise, Congress
hoped to help diversify and promote modest competition in the secondary market.”).
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program.16 This support reached such an excess that government
support for housing and our societal faith in that support, has been
deemed one of the leading causes of the financial crisis of 2008.17
While home ownership may be the area for which the connection to
wealth accumulation has been the most clearly articulated, it is certainly
not the only area in which expansion of opportunity to different groups
has been accepted as a legitimate government objective. Education
policy is another area in which the principle that the government should
promote the expansion of opportunity is salient. The stated purpose of
recent education policy has been to improve the educational outcomes of
economically disadvantaged groups in order to facilitate their access to
opportunities for economic and social mobility.18 Fundamentally, the
goal of “No Child Left Behind” was “excellence and equity in education
16. See Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 417, 436-37 (2008) ([T]he Federal Housing Administration . . . insures lenders
against the risk of default on single-family homes. The FHA gives middle income
families the ability to purchase housing at affordable rates of interest by providing them
access to credit that was not available to middle-income earners to such an extent prior
to its creation.”).
17. The federal government continually encouraged widespread access to housing
since the 1930s to avert economic crises or overcome increasing economic inequality.
That encouragement came in the form of government institutions providing guarantees
for low-income debt or pushing the government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) to
increase its support of low-income borrowing. As the federal government held more of
the risk of low-income debt, the private sector was able to offer credit to more debtors
with little income, assets, or savings. When the low-income debtors defaulted, the
private sector experienced a systemic shock. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES:
HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 32-45 (Princeton
University Press 2010) (“[S]ubprime lending and the associated subprime mortgagebacked securities were central to this crisis. Without any intent of absolving the brokers
and the banks who originated the bad loans or the borrowers who lied about their
incomes, we should acknowledge the evidence suggesting that government actions,
however well intended, contributed significantly to the crisis.”).
18. “Education has always been a fundamental part of achieving the American
Dream. An educated citizen is more likely to hold a good job, escape poverty, own a
home, start a business, be free from crime, and participate in America’s democracy.”
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, EDUCATION: THE PROMISE OF
AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2004), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/-2004/09/20040926.html. “Now, for years, we’ve recognized that
education is a prerequisite for prosperity.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on Education Reform at the National Urban League Centennial Conference
(July 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-education-reform-national-urban-league-centennial-conference.
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for all students.”19 It sought to achieve this by punishing schools,
through a variety of measures, for not meeting certain basic standards.20
The goal was to ensure that even the most disadvantaged students
attained basic grade level proficiency in math, reading, and science21 in
order to participate as well-informed members of the electorate and to
adapt to the changing demands of the information age.22 The Obama
Administration has continued the pursuit of this goal with its “Race to
the Top” program, in which states compete for a share of a $4 billion
fund by implementing plans to improve teacher accountability, expand

19. David Nash, Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and Equity
in Partnership with the States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 242 (2002). The law required
states to adopt standards, conduct assessments, and report “adequate yearly progress,”
continually increasing the level of students who meet the standard of proficiency,
meeting 100% by 2013-14. Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act
Needs to be Restructured to Accomplish its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (2007).
20. Schools that did not meet the appropriate standards would lose funding and be
forced to undertake restructuring action necessary to enable them to meet standards.
Ratner, supra note 19, at 9-11. Students of low-income families who are the most
disadvantaged by underperforming schools will be given the first opportunity to transfer
to better performing schools in the area. Amy M. Reichbach, The Power Behind the
Promise: Enforcing No Child Left Behind to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667,
675-76 (2004). As of 2008, schools in 32 states have been sanctioned for low
performance. Jessica Flynn, No Child Left Behind Gets a Tip From Tort Theory:
Protecting Responsible Schools Against Undeserved Sanctions, 31 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 157, 169 (2008). See also Sam Dillon, Under ‘No Child’ Law, Even Solid Schools
Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/13/education/13child.html?pagewanted=1&ref=no_child_left_behind_act
(“Schools that miss targets for two consecutive years are labeled ‘needing
improvement’ and face escalating sanctions that can include staff changes or
closings.”); Annie Correal, Leaving the No Child Left Behind List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2009, at L12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/nyregion/longisland/22improveli.html?ref=no_child_left_behind_act (“At the Caroline G. Atkinson
School, which serves ... fifth and sixth graders, and which was also taken off the
[“Needs Improvement”] list this year, the school doubled the time devoted to math and
English language arts, and added after-school and Saturday tutoring sessions, with the
help of private grants . . . . A school or district is removed from the list when it shows
improvement two years in a row in student performance in an area where a problem was
identified.”).
21. Matthew D. Knepper, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of the No Child
Left Behind Act’s One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and its Consequences, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 899 (2009).
22. Ratner, supra note 19, at 4-5.
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charter schools, and improve the lowest-achieving schools.23 The
purpose of these measures is to expand educational opportunities to
those who are not sufficiently wealthy or informed enough to access
better quality schools. The program seeks to improve the quality of all
schools, but particularly those that service disadvantaged children, in
order to expand their opportunities.
Perhaps the expansion of educational opportunities to
disadvantaged groups is perceived as inherently justified because
guaranteeing certain educational opportunities has long been a legal and
political American value. More than twenty-eight years ago, the
Supreme Court demonstrated its concern for equality of opportunity in
education when it held that children of illegal immigrants could not be
denied public schooling.24 The Court articulated the consequences of
inequality by asserting that, “[c]hildren denied an education are placed
at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an
uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve. And when
those children are members of an identifiable group, that group—
through the State’s action—will have been converted into a discrete
underclass.”25 Thus, preventing the perpetuation of a discrete underclass
has been recognized as a legitimate social objective in the context of
education. While the promotion of wealth accumulation (apart from
housing) has not been consistently recognized as a regulatory goal, the
perpetuation of classes divided by wealth through the concentration of
opportunities for wealth accumulation is not remarkably different from
the consequences of the concentration of educational opportunities.
Beyond economic disadvantages, the U.S. government has also
sought to expand opportunities to racial groups who would not
otherwise have them.
Civil rights advocates have agreed that
“[g]overnment . . . was responsible for ensuring that each individual had
23. The “Race to the Top” program also focused on preparing “students to succeed
in college and the workplace and to compete in the global economy.” See Race to the
Top Fund Executive Summary, United States Department of Education (Nov. 2003),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. Of the
46 states that applied to the competition, 11 states and the District of Columbia received
a share of the $4 billion. See Press Release, United States Department of Education,
Nine States and the District of Columbia Win Second Round Race to the Top Grants
(Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/nine-states-and-districtcolumbia-win-second-round-race-top-grants.
24. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
25. Id. at 234.
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access to all spheres of public activity – social, economic, and political –
regardless of race, sex, or ethnic origin.”26 Through civil rights
legislation, the government sought to expand opportunities of all kinds –
employment, education, access to public accommodations, and voting
rights – to groups who might have otherwise been restricted from
them.27 It did so to prevent the continued segregation of opportunity in
our society.
Thus, in multiple arenas apart from financial regulation – housing,
education, and civil rights – the U.S. government took steps to expand
the opportunities available to groups who might not have had those
opportunities without some form of government intervention. Housing
policy sought to make it easier for more households to own homes,
despite limitations on wealth and access to credit. Education policy
sought to provide students living in neighborhoods where their schools
were disadvantaged with opportunities available to those situated more
favorably with respect to their income and geography. Civil rights
legislation sought to promote opportunities for those denied them
because of their race. In each of these cases, multiple justifications for
the chosen policies were present. The expansion of opportunity as an
end in itself was not the only potential justification for these policies, but
it was perceived and utilized as a legitimate justification.
In all of these arenas, social policy justifications were not limited to
26. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action – Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1312 (1986).
27. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03CivilRights06111963.htm (“It ought to be possible for American consumers
of any color to receive equal service in places of public accommodation, such as hotels
and restaurants and theaters and retail stores, without being forced to resort to
demonstrations in the street, and it ought to be possible for American citizens of any
color to register to vote in a free election without interference or fear of reprisal . . . .
[An African-American], regardless of the section of the Nation in which he is born, has
about one-half as much chance of completing a high school as a white baby born in the
same place on the same day, one-third as much chance of completing college, one-third
as much chance of becoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becoming
unemployed, about one-seventh as much chance of earning $10,000 a year, a life
expectancy which is 7 years shorter, and the prospects of earning only half as much . . .
. I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not
fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or
law.”).
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arguments regarding market efficiency and the need to mitigate market
failures, even though these arguments were just as salient in these areas
as in the case of financial regulation. For instance, supporting housing
has positive externalities for economic growth,28 psychological wellbeing,29 and political participation.30 Market failures prevented more
widespread distribution of these benefits.31 With respect to education
28. See Dimitri B. Papadimitriou et al., The Effects of a Declining Housing Market
on the U.S. Economy 5-6 (Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 506, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999957 (“There are several ways in which housing
is an integral part of a growing economy, especially in periods of rapidly rising home
values. First, homebuilding, furniture sales, and home improvements account for a
large percentage of GDP. Government statistics show that the residential investment
sector is already acting as a drag on economic growth. Second, rising home prices
increase household net worth, and consumers probably base their spending decisions
partly on their net worth, not just their income.”) (internal citations omitted).
29. Christopher E. Herbert & Eric S. Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of
Low-Income and Minority Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, 10
CITYSCAPE 5, 9 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341163 (“Another
significant benefit thought to be associated with homeownership is higher life
satisfaction and better psychological health. Owners are thought to have higher selfesteem, due to both the higher social status associated with homeownership and the
sense of accomplishment that results from having achieved a significant life goal.”).
30. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6363, 1998), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/54.Glaeser.
Home_.pdf (arguing that homeownership is connected to specific externalities that are
proxies for social connection and political participation.
“Homeowners are
approximately 10 percent more likely to know their U.S. representative by name. They
are 9 percent more likely know the identity of their school board head. Homeowners are
15 percent more likely to vote in local elections and 6 percent more likely to work to
solve local problems. On average, they are members of .25 more non-professional
organizations than non-owners. Homeowners are 12 percent more likely to garden and
10 percent more likely to own guns. Homeowners attend church more frequently than
renters.”) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro,
The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37
(2003)).
31. The lack of more widespread housing ownership prior to the emergence of
subprime lending was the result of inadequately functioning credit markets because of
information barriers. Subprime lending led to an increase in homeownership as credit
was made available to groups previously excluded from credit markets. See Todd J.
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (Winter 2009) (citing James R. Barth et al., Despite Foreclosures,
Subprime Lending Increases Homeownership, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE DATA SERIES
(Milken Inst.) (Dec. 2007)). The previously excluded groups were able to access credit
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policy, positive externalities result from a more educated population.32
As for civil rights, in addition to the compelling democratic arguments
for promoting them,33 information problems also perpetuate
discrimination.34 Along with these alternative justifications, expanding
markets because of the increased use of objective credit scores that gave lenders better
information on which potential borrowers were credit worthy. See id. at 7 (“Subprime
lending emerged as a result of interest rate deregulation and improved underwriting
procedures that reduced some of those information asymmetries, including increased
use of credit scoring as an indicator of willingness and ability to repay a loan. The use
of credit scores as objective tests of borrower risk allowed lenders to create a schedule
of interest rates and other loan terms that currently make up the mortgage market,
leaving traditional one-size-fits-all lending products as relics of the past.”) (citing
Kristopher Gerardi, Harvey S. Rosen & Paul Willen, Do Households Benefit from
Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market 8 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Boston, Pub. Pol’y Discussion Papers No. 06-6, 2006)).
32. James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz, & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1204 (2010) (“A common
example of a good with a positive externality is education. Better-educated people make
better citizens, improve the quality of democratic decision making, are less likely to
lead lives of crime, and otherwise contribute positively to the lives of others.”); Rachel
Denae Thrasher & Kevin P. Gallagher, 21st Century Trade Agreements: Implications
for Development Sovereignty, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 313, 318 (2010) (“Basic
literacy and education have positive externalities such as improved health and better
participation in democratic processes . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream: Address at March on
Washington (Aug. 28, 1963) (“In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a
check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note
to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes,
black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”). See also ERIKA WOOD, RESTORING THE RIGHT
TO VOTE 1 (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 2009), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/5c8532e8134b233182_z5m6ibv1n.pdf (“The right to vote
forms the core of American democracy. Our history is marked by successful struggles
to expand the franchise, to include those previously barred from the electorate because
of race, class, or gender. As a result our democracy is richer, more diverse, and more
representative of the people than ever before.”); Christopher Leon Jones, Jr., The
Protection of Democracy: The Symbolic Nature of Federal Hate Crime Legislation, 29
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 17, 35 (2003) (“One’s exercise of political liberty is dependent on
the protection of one’s personal liberty; therefore, the existence of civil rights is a key
virtue of democracy. Accordingly, the recognition and protection of civil rights is also
necessary for the proper functioning of democracy.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
34. Paulo R. A. Loureiro & Adolfo Sachsida, Adverse Selection, Asymmetric
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opportunity was, and still is, an acknowledged and legitimate
justification for these policies.35
Like these social policies, securities regulation can and should be
justified on a number of grounds, but historically, expanding
opportunities for wealth accumulation across sectors of the population
has not been a justification that has been given credence. This paper
advocates for, and examines the implications of, implementing an
opportunities-based perspective in evaluating securities regulation for
policy decisions. I demonstrate how the policy implications of such a
perspective are often distinct from those implicated by other approaches,
such as a public welfare approach to securities regulation. In this
Article, I apply this perspective and what we know from the empirical
research about investor behavior36 to examine how securities policy
could be shaped by an opportunities-based perspective in four areas: (1)
enhancing access to information and financial institutions;37 (2)
requiring disclosures;38 (3) impacting the behavioral biases of

Information and Discrimination in the Labor Market, 30 PLANEJAMENTO E POLÍTICAS
PÚBLICAS [PPP] 71, 76 (2007) (Braz.) (“[A]symmetric information is a strong
determinant of discrimination, which the main outcome being that workers with
different productivities earn the same wage.”); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical
Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972) (noting that an
employer will discriminate against a group of workers if the cost of obtaining
information about the individuals is excessive).
35. See Beville, Falaschetti, & Orlando, supra note 1 (on housing); Nash, supra
note 19 (on education); Abram, supra note 26 (on Civil Rights legislation).
36. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund
Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005); Paredes,
supra note 4; Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral
Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Olivier
Armantier, Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations? (CIRANO,
Working Paper No. 2006s-13, 2006); Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre,
Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison (Pompeu Fabra Univ.
Dep’t of Econ. and Bus., Working Paper No. 692, 2003); Robert Bloomfield, Robert
Libby, & Mark W. Nelson, Confidence and the Welfare of Less-Informed Investors
(Jan. 30, 1998) (working paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=72068); Barbara
Döbeli & Paolo Vanini, Stated and Revealed Investment Decisions Concerning
Structured Products (Apr. 4, 2008) (Jan. 30, 1998) (working paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991868).
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.
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investors;39 and (4) aligning the incentives of investment professionals to
better facilitate the wealth accumulation of their clients.40 The
implications of applying an opportunities-based approach to financial
regulation are distinct from those of a public welfare or efficiency
approach to regulation. More so than these other approaches, an
opportunities-based approach requires an understanding of the empirical
realities of investor behavior and yields policy recommendations
targeted at increasing opportunities for wealth accumulation for the
average investor.

II. DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS
TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTS
Access to financial markets, like access to education, employment,
public accommodations, and a host of other areas, is significant in
promoting opportunity.41
In the case of financial markets, the
opportunity at stake is the opportunity to create and accumulate wealth.
The adage, “it takes money to make money,”42 or, in other words, the
assumption that wealth is required to create more wealth, embodies the
idea that wealth results from the taking of large risks and that the
wealthy are more likely and better able to bear such risks.43 While these

39.
40.
41.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 127 (2004)
(“[I]mproved access to bank accounts can reduce the costs of financial services for the
poor, expand access to lower-cost forms of credit and increase opportunities for saving-all key to reducing poverty and expanding social mobility.”).
42. See Christopher H. Lytton, Soft Money: The Weapon of Choice for the
Runaway Productions, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 719, 736 (2004) (“The old adage is true:
it takes money to make money.”); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 258 (2004) (“[I]t takes money to make money, and that is why the
rich get richer and the poor get poorer.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Robert
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic By Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and
Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership
Society”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 90 (2005) (providing one manifestation of the old
adage, that a lender will mitigate risk by taking a security interest in an asset already
owned by the borrower, or by requiring a guaranty from a well-resourced associate of
the borrower).
43. See Sarah Molseed, An Ownership Society For All: Community Development
Financial Institutions as the Bridge Between Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building
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assumptions do have some truth to them, a societal problem arises when
government action perpetuates the superior opportunities of the wealthy
to become wealthier. Inequity in the opportunity to grow wealth should
not be facilitated by the government any more than inequities in
opportunities for education, employment, accommodations, and the like.
Because of both the actual and expressive effects of government
action on the relationships between different groups in society, the
government does and should consider how its actions impact the
perception and actuality of equity in the realm of securities regulation.
In its current role of re-examining a host of market structure issues,44 the
SEC is in a position to consider the impact on opportunities in its
rulemaking. By not taking into account differentiation in access, the
government perpetuates the ability of certain groups to obtain
advantages in the accumulation of wealth not available to other groups,
thereby exacerbating disparities in opportunity.
Creating disparities in the ability to grow wealth could create selfperpetuating cycles of entitlement. Research in psychology and
economics has demonstrated that a danger of creating distinctions
between the wealthy and non-wealthy is that such distinctions can create
cycles of entitlement for the affluent and an acceptance of less equitable
outcomes by the poor.45 Experiments have demonstrated that once
individuals are endowed with relative wealth, they become accustomed
Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 489, 492 (2006) (noting that a household’s
stock of assets impacts its access to credit and “the ability to collateralize, thus opening
the door to more credit and subsequent opportunities”); Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532-35 (1996) (describing how wealth impacts the ability to
bear risk, particularly in the context of pursuing a potentially lucrative legal claim);
Robert Frank, How the Rich Invest, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2007/06/12/how-the-rich-invest/
(“The
rich
invest
differently because, well, they’re different. They can take more risks because they have
more money to lose. And they can invest for the long-term . . . because they have so
much extra capital . . . . The rich prefer to invest directly in start-up companies . . . .
The reasons for these differences are mainly access and suitability. Investing in startups is not as feasible for everyday investors because they don’t have all the information
on hot new start-ups that the rich often get, known as “deal flow”. And even if they did,
everyday investors wouldn’t be able to risk the necessary capital.”).
44. For a detailed examination of several areas of market structure examination, see
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Strengthening
Our
Equity
Market
Structure,
(Sep.
7,
2010),
available
at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch090710mls.htm.
45. See Armantier, supra note 36, at 419-20.
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to wealth differences over time.46 This phenomenon was illustrated in
an experiment with variations of the classic ultimatum game, in which
participants were classified as rich proposers and poor proposers.47 In
one treatment group, the proposers were rich while the receivers were
poor, while in another treatment group, the proposers were poor and the
receivers were rich.48 The experimenters found that even though
participants initially strived for egalitarian distributions, over multiple
repetitions of the game the rich proposers became less generous and the
poor accepted lower offers.49 Similarly, the poor proposers became
more generous over time while rich receivers became more
demanding.50 As a result, the treatment groups, which began with a
relatively small degree of inequity relative to the control group, ended
up with a drastically different distribution than the control group. The
party endowed with more wealth had significantly increased its wealth
relative to the other party by the end of a 60-stage game.51
While the implications of this experiment should be extrapolated
with caution, these results support the theory that those who are
endowed feel more entitled to a larger share of societal wealth while the
poor become accustomed to receiving a smaller proportion over time.
Similarly, studies of inequity in pay between CEOs and employees have
shown that greater inequity in pay gives CEOs a greater feeling of power
and that they are more apt to maltreat employees.52 While wealth and
income are distinct, it is not implausible that exacerbating already
significant wealth differentials could have significant consequences for
the ability of different groups of society to empathize with each other.
These findings have policy implications. If the law facilitates
opportunities for wealth accumulation primarily for the affluent or a
select few, then these chosen groups will come to expect such
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., id.
Id. at 408-13, 425.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 411-12, 425.
See, e.g., Sreedhari Desai, Arthur Brief & Jennifer George, When Executives
Rake in Millions: Meanness in Organizations 25-26 (June 24, 2010) (working paper,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612486) (finding in an experiment that
individuals designated as managers and varying levels of inequity in pay displayed an
increased tendency to “fire” individuals designated as employees even when those
“employees” turned in an adequate performance of the designated tasks).
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opportunities and demand more of them, while the non-wealthy will
become accustomed to inequitable distributions and being restricted in
the opportunity to grow their wealth. Several examples of areas in
which differential access in the securities markets is present and
facilitated by government regulation merit reform in light of an
opportunities-based perspective.
If we accept the premise of the opportunities-based perspective –
differences in opportunity created by the government, whether perceived
or actual, matter for societal well-being – then we should be particularly
skeptical of blatant separations between classes facilitated by
government regulation. An example of an area of blatant separation
created by financial regulation is the restriction on which investors can
invest in hedge funds based on their ability to meet the net worth
requirements articulated in the accredited investor standard.53
Historically, the SEC has permitted certain financial institutions, such as
hedge funds, to escape regulation.54 In order to protect unsophisticated,
individual investors from the market imperfections of the unregulated
world of hedge funds, the SEC restricts who can invest in a hedge
fund.55 The SEC introduced the accredited investor requirement for
investing in hedge funds in 1982.56 The SEC believed that hedge funds
engage in risky investment strategies and that the best way to shield
unsophisticated individual investors from such risk was to keep them
from investing in the funds directly.57 Thus, in order to combat the
potential market failure of information problems in the hedge fund
53.
54.

See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Matthew F. Gately, Much Ado About Nothing: An Analysis of the
“Accredited Natural Person” Standard, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 760, 761; David
Schneider, If At First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to
Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 261, 263 (2009); Scott V. Wagner,
Hedge Funds: The Final Frontier of Securities Regulation and a Last Hope For
Economic Revival, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009).
55. Gately, supra note 54, at 776; Schneider, supra note 54, at 289.
56. Wagner, supra note 54, at 9-10. See SEC General Rules and Regulations,
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010) (defining accredited investor);
See also Gately, supra note 54, at 762; Schneider, supra note 54, at 272-73 (discussing
the requirements needed to satisfy the exemption under Regulation D).
57. Gately, supra note 54, at 776; Schneider, supra note 54, at 289; U.S.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
80-81 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
[hereinafter 2003 Report].

2011]

ANOTHER ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATION:
EXPANDING INVESTOR OPPORTUNITY

801

market – the problem that most investors would not understand and be
able to evaluate the risks of investing in hedge funds – the SEC
responded by preventing most investors from accessing hedge funds.
Originally, the requirements for accreditation as a hedge fund
investor were an individual annual income of at least $200,000 and a net
worth of at least $1 million.58 In 2006, the SEC proposed rules requiring
that an accredited investor own investments of at least $2.5 million, in
addition to the income and net worth requirements, in order to invest in
hedge funds.59 The SEC’s theory behind this accredited natural person
standard was that, in addition to increasing the net worth requirement,
ownership of investments at this level would provide a “clear standard to
use in ascertaining whether a purchaser of a private investment vehicle’s
securities is likely to have sufficient knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters to enable that purchaser to evaluate the
merits and risks of a prospective investment, or to hire someone who
can.”60 Before these rules were adopted, Congress included a provision
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010). See also Gately, supra note 54, at 762;
Schneider, supra note 54, at 272-73; Wagner, supra note 54, at 10.
59. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Placement Vehicles, Securities Act Release No.
8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (Jan. 4, 2007) (proposed Dec. 27, 2006) (consideration
deferred pending comments review) [hereinafter 2006 Proposed Rule]. See also Gately,
supra note 54, at 768-69. Under the proposed rules, investments are to be defined as in
rule 2a51-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, excluding the provisions that
do not apply to natural persons. 2006 Proposed Rule, at 407. See also 17 C.F.R. §
270.2a51-1 (2010) (defining investments). In 2007, the SEC recommended modifying
the accredited investor standard to include an “investments-owned” standard.
Accordingly, an individual would enjoy accredited investor status by owning at least
$750,000 worth of investments. The newly developed “investments-owned” standard
could be substituted for the current net worth and income requirements. Revisions of
Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-8828, 72
Fed. Reg. 45116, 45123-24 (Aug. 10, 2007) (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (consideration
deferred pending comments review) [hereinafter 2007 Proposed Rule]. In addition, the
income and net worth requirements would be adjusted for inflation beginning in 2012
and then every five years thereafter. Id. at 45126. These proposals also included the
creation of a new classification, the large accredited investor, which would be met if an
individual owned $2.5 million in investments or had an annual income of $400,000. Id.
at 45118. The SEC estimates that 1.64% of households would qualify under the large
accredited investor standard. Id. at 45119.
60. 2006 Proposed Rule, supra note 59, at 405. The SEC justified proposing the
more stringent requirements because compiled data revealed that a much greater
percentage of individuals qualified as accredited investors in 2003 than in 1982. Id. at
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limiting the eligibility requirements of accredited investors in the
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).61 Congress directed the SEC to exclude
the value of an individual’s primary residence when computing the
individual’s net worth as applicable to the current accredited investor
standard; fewer individuals, as a result, can satisfactorily meet the
conditions necessary for becoming accredited investors.62 In 2011, the
SEC proposed rules that would add this provision to the accredited
investor standard.63
The rationale for denial of access to hedge funds appears to be the
desire to isolate the realm in which complex financial institutions, which
are difficult to regulate, can cause harm.64 The accredited investor
standard, however, does not serve to shelter the non-accredited investor
from the risks of hedge funds.65 Far more individuals are indirectly

406; 2003 Report, supra note 57. In 1982, for example, 1.87% of U.S. households
qualified for accredited investor status as compared to approximately 8.47% in 2003,
representing a 350% increase. 2006 Proposed Rule, supra note 59, at 406. By
incorporating the accredited natural person standard under the proposed revisions, the
SEC estimates that only 1.3% of U.S. households would qualify for accredited investor
status, which is lower even than the 1982 level. Id.
61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577-78 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
62. Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577. The SEC is directed to review the accredited
investor standard four years after the Act’s enactment (and every four years thereafter)
and make adjustments as deemed necessary “for the protection of investors, in the
public interest, and in light of the economy.” Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577-78.
63. Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 339177, 76 Fed. Reg. 5307 (Jan. 31, 2011) (proposed Jan. 25, 2011).
64. See Wagner, supra note 54, at 18 (“Thus, the SEC reasons, hedge funds should
only be available to sophisticated investors who have a high net wealth thereby
minimizing the risk of severe loss to average investors.”).
65. “Accredited investors who can no longer directly invest in hedge funds because
they do not meet the new accredited natural person standard will still be able to meet
the lower financial requirements of funds of funds. While it is true that investing in a
fund of funds provides additional investor protections, the shift from direct investment
to indirect investment will not reduce the total amount of capital entering the hedge
fund industry or the number of investors impacted by the industry.” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Gately, supra note 54, at 773 (arguing that nonaccredited persons may still be exposed to the risks of hedge funds through financial
instruments called “funds of funds,” or retail funds that invest in various hedge funds,
thus mitigating or eliminating the protections offered by the “Accredited Natural Person
Standard”).
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exposed to the risks associated with hedge funds66 by investing in funds
of hedge funds (“FOHFs”)67 and could also be exposed to hedge funds
through their pension funds.68 Moreover, hedge funds impose systemic
risk on the rest of the financial market because of their increasing
number and size, the concentration of the largest funds in the hands of a
few advisers, and their use of leverage as a major investment strategy.69
Thus, non-accredited investors are exposed to the risks of hedge funds
through indirect investment as well as through the systemic risk imposed
by hedge funds on the financial system.
Although limiting access has not entirely shielded non-accredited
investors from hedge funds70 and we do not know that hedge funds are
any more risky on average than other investment vehicles,71
66. See, e.g., 2003 Report, supra note 57, at 82 (“[R]etail investors seeking
diversification by investing in a Dual Registered FOHF . . . may take on more risk than
desired as a part of their overall portfolio.”); Id. (“Although [pension plans, universities,
endowments, foundations and other charitable organizations] typically qualify as
“accredited investors” or “qualified purchasers,” these institutions, by investing in
hedge funds, expose their participants or other beneficiaries to hedge funds.”).
67. Id. at 68-69. Only a Dual-Registered FOHF (registered under both the
Investment Company Act and the Securities Act) may publicly offer its securities.
Currently, all registered FOHF’s have restricted their sales to individuals who meet the
accredited investor standard, at a minimum. This requirement, however, is not
established by law, and can be changed by an FOHF at any time.
68. Id. at 82 (“Pension plans were among the earliest hedge fund investors. The
pace of these investments, however, has increased over the past few years.”). See also
Wagner, supra note 54, at 24. (“Investors of the banks or beneficiaries of pension funds
thus often indirectly, and often inadvertently, expose themselves to hedge fund risk.”).
Alarmingly, pension funds, as of January 2005, accounted for 7% of hedge fund capital
sources. Id.
69. Schneider, supra note 54, at 287.
70. 2003 Report, supra notes 57 and accompanying text.
71. Shadab, supra note 9, at 240. (“In 2008, as losses from the U.S. subprime
mortgage market transformed into an international financial crisis, the value of global
equities dropped 42 percent while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller
19 percent for their investors.”); Id. at 271 (“The foregoing innovative hedge fund
investment strategies have the general effect of reducing an investor’s exposure to
market risk.”); Id. at 272 (“[H]edge funds have a relatively low correlation to standard
systematic factors compared to mutual funds.”); Id. at
292 (“[D]espite the
unprecedented 19 percent annual loss, hedge fund performance in 2008 was at an all
time high relative to the U.S. public equity market, which lost 38.47 percent of its
value. Hedge funds also far outperformed stock mutual funds, which lost an average of
37.6 percent in 2008.”) (footnote omitted). See also Kelly Bit, Hedge Funds Took in
$16 Billion in October, Most in a Year, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 7, 2010, available at
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differentiating access has continued to be the preferred means of
regulation. Policy alternatives, however, do exist. In order to limit the
impact of hedge funds on the rest of the financial system, regulators
could impose limits on the risk exuded by hedge funds by restricting
credit to hedge funds, imposing leverage ratio limits, or correlating
leverage limits with the riskiness of hedge fund assets.72 If evaluated
from a public welfare perspective, limiting the credit and thereby the
risk taken on by hedge funds has clear trade-offs. On the one hand,
limiting risk addresses the externality of the potential systemic risk
imposed on the whole market by the risky transactions of one hedge
fund that could impact thousands of counterparties.73 On the other hand,
if the market is willing to provide credit and allow the hedge fund to be
as leveraged as it is, regulations create distortions that prevent the
market from working as it otherwise would. Regulations might limit the
upside potential of hedge funds, decreasing wealth and potentially
decreasing investment by the wealthy.74
If an opportunities-based perspective is considered along with the
traditional social welfare approach, then the possible disincentives for
investing by the wealthy are weighed against the loss in opportunities
for others to invest. Once the incorporation of an opportunities-based
perspective occurs, differentiating access is no longer a preferred means
of regulation. If the policy problem that regulation is attempting to
address is that hedge funds hold portfolios that are too risky to serve as
the sole means of investment for an individual’s retirement, then
regulation could limit the percentage of an investor’s savings that are
invested in a hedge fund. Such a regulation could both protect the
wealth of unsophisticated investors as well as convey the expressive

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/hedge-funds-took-in-16-billion-inoctober-most-in-a-year.html (“Preliminary data show that hedge funds are
outperforming the S&P 500 by about 21 basis points through November [2010].”).
72. Schneider, supra note 54, at 307-08.
73. Id. at 307 (noting that with leverage limits, hedge funds will be less likely to
fail, and should they fail, “creditors will feel less pain which will stem the possible
ripple effect”).
74. Id. (“One downside of [imposing leverage limits] is that, although losses are
less magnified, profits will also not be as magnified. Hedge funds may no longer be
able to provide the above market returns that they have shown over the years and they
will become less popular investment vehicles. Any decrease in the utilization of hedge
funds may also correspondingly diminish the benefits that they provide to the market
and investors.”).
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message that the purpose of regulation is to further diversify and
mitigate risk – not to separate society into those sufficiently wealthy to
escape regulation and those who are not.75 Moreover, those who could
benefit from the wealth-enhancing opportunities of hedge funds, but are
not currently eligible, could benefit from access to these financial
institutions, thereby increasing social welfare.
Another area of differentiation is access to information. The
flourishing of flash orders and dark pools, to which only limited parties
have access, is not so different from the world of hedge funds. Flash
orders permit some investors to see the prices of certain securities
milliseconds before other investors.76 Flash orders create differential
access to information between the general public who receives its
information from the consolidated quotation data and those select
market participants, generally those with access to special technology,
who receive a market’s individual data feed.77 Commentators have
argued that such orders provide an unfair advantage to insiders, allowing
these individuals to trade ahead of the public.78 Yet, it is not clear that
75. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 693
(2010) (“[F]raming has been recognized as a critical tool for politicians and parties
alike, in the effort to control the agenda and the hearts and minds of Americans.”); Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2026 (1996).
(“[A]n appropriately framed law may influence social norms and push them in the right
direction. For example, if the law mandates recycling, perhaps it will affect social
norms about the environment in a way that is different from (and better than) the way
curbside charges might affect norms.”).
76. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the
Spotlight on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal
Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1041 (2010).
77. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 60684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48636 (Sep. 23, 2009)
(proposed Sept. 18, 2009) (period for public comment reopened July 2, 2010) (hereafter
2009 Flash Order Exception).
78. See, e.g., Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency
Trading: Use and Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, 36 (2010) (“[Senator
Charles] Schumer argued that flash orders allow market insiders to utilize rapid trading
platforms to trade ahead of those orders and profit from advanced knowledge of buying
and selling activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Traders who benefit from
the use of flash orders are shown the buy and sell orders ahead of everyone else in the
marketplace in exchange for a fee. With this very small advance notice of market
conditions, high frequency traders can use their super-computers to conduct rapid
statistical analysis of the changing market state and trade ahead of the public market.”
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these insiders are not retail-side investors who may use the advantages
of flash orders to lower transaction costs, allowing them to benefit a
large segment of the public through passed on benefits such as reduced
commissions.79 Empirically, therefore, we do not know whether the
presence of flash orders expands or restricts opportunities for wealth
accumulation across sectors of the population.
The SEC proposed a rule calling for the ban of flash orders in
2009.80 Regulation has been justified, in part, by arguments that are
consistent with an opportunities-based perspective and should be more
explicitly tied to such a perspective. If an opportunities-based
perspective were to be employed, the effects of flash orders on different
segments of the population should be taken into account when
considering adoption of the flash order proposal. Relevant justifications
under an opportunities-based perspective have included that the use of
flash orders could detract from the fairness and efficiency of the
markets, that they may create a two-tiered market where the public does
not have access to the most accurate pricing information, that they may
create a disincentive for the public display of trading interest and harm
quote competition among markets, and that they may decrease investor
confidence by putting the common investor at a disadvantage to those
with greater resources.81
Similar considerations are relevant when evaluating the regulation
of dark pools. Dark pools, which are mediums where parties can trade
without being regulated as they would be on an exchange,82 have
Id. at 28. “The SEC is mainly concerned with the possible creation of a two-tiered
market system, which favors those with sophisticated computer systems over retail
investors.” Id. at 37. “[O]nly those who have invested in sophisticated trading systems
are able to effectively access flash orders.” 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77,
at 48634.
79. 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48638; David D. Gruberg,
Decent Exposure: The SEC’s Lack of Authority and Restraint in Proposing to Eliminate
Flash Trading, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 263, 286 (2010).
80. The exception for flash orders in the national securities laws was first approved
in 1978. Flash orders as commonly referred to today, however, developed with
improved technology as trading become more automated and electronic. 2009 Flash
Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48632.
81. 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48635-36, 48638.
82. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 60997,
74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61208 (Nov. 23, 2009) (proposed Nov. 13, 2009) (hereafter 2009
Proposed Rule). Dark pools have been created to operate under Regulation ATS, which
allows trading to occur in venues not subject to the strict regulatory requirements of
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increased in number from 10 in 2002 to 29 in 200983 and have grown to
account for over 10% of all trading volume in 2010.84 Dark pools
provide those investors who have access to them with a high-level of
pre-trade privacy, allowing them select access to information on prices
and sizes of transactions, and often provide a better price than is
available on publicly traded exchanges.85 Currently, the existence of
dark pools creates differential access to information between those select
individuals and institutions that are granted access to a dark pool and the
rest of the general investing public.86 Dark pools do not have to comply
with fair access requirements until they exceed a volume threshold.87
While the Fair Access Rule generally prohibits alternative trading
systems from unreasonably prohibiting or limiting access to the trading
system88 and requires alternative trading systems to keep and report
records of whom they grant and deny access,89 dark pools can avoid the
fair access requirements if the trading volume of a particular security in
the dark pool is less than 5% of the security’s average daily volume
traded in four of the preceding six months.90
Commentators have argued that hiding information from the public
through dark pools could harm the validity of price quotes and keep
section 6 of the Exchange Act. Hatch, supra note 76, at 1036-37.
83. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61208-09.
84. Nina Mehta, SEC Should Force Dark Pools to Improve Market Prices, NYSE
Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-04-23/sec-should-force-dark-pools-to-improve-market-prices-nysesays.html (“Dark pools . . . handled 10 percent of U.S. equity trading in February
[2010], compared with 5.8 percent in March 2008.”).
85. Hatch, supra note 76, at 1037-38. See also 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82,
at 61211.
86. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61211 (“The public . . . does not have
access to this valuable information concerning the best prices and sizes for NMS stocks.
Rather, dark pools transmit this information only to selected market participants. In this
regard, actionable IOIs can create a two-tiered level of access to information about the
best prices and sizes for NMS stocks that undermines the Exchange Act objectives for a
national market system.”).
87. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5) (2011).
88. “Establish written standards for granting access to trading on its system.” 17
C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(A) (2011); “Not unreasonably prohibit or limit any person in
respect to access to services offered by such alternative trading system by applying the
standards established under paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) of this section in an unfair or
discriminatory manner.” §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(B).
89. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(C-D) (2011).
90. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(i) (2011).
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investors from knowing if they are getting the best price for their
transactions, and that better prices in dark pools could take liquidity out
of conventional exchanges.91 At the same time, an argument for the
presence of dark pools is that a lack of pre-trade transparency can allow
block trades to occur by providing an opportunity for market participants
to find trading interest for large-size orders without simultaneously
causing an impact on price.92 Such pre-trade opacity could be beneficial
to institutional investors, with whom many individuals have their
pension and 401(k) accounts, that need to trade in large sizes and can
benefit from this lack of pre-trade transparency.93 In considering the
regulation of dark pools, the Commission has expressed concern that
trading in dark pools undermines the concept of creating a national
market system by creating a two-tiered level of access to information,
and that the private trading may discourage the display of public interest
and thereby limit competition.94 These justifications are focused on the
appearance of a lack of opportunity for the unsophisticated investor, and
the Commission should continue to emphasize this perspective as it
evaluates proposals to regulate dark pools.
For both flash orders and dark pools, in addition to the effects that
result from how dark pools and flash orders are perceived, the
Commission should also consider empirical investigations of these
mechanisms’ effects on different classes of investors when the
Commission is deciding whether and how to regulate in a way that
would promote opportunities for wealth accumulation across a broad
segment of the population. When we view these proposals from an
opportunities-based perspective, we should be assessing whether and to
what extent the presence of flash orders and dark pools creates definitive
classes between those who are advantaged and those who are not.
The Commission’s policies and rhetoric with respect to
opportunities have potentially significant consequences because
government action can create both the reality and perception of the idea
that the wealthy are favored and are entitled to even more opportunities.
When one group, such as the affluent, is believed to have a particular
sphere of influence over an institution, public trust in that institution can

91.
92.
93.
94.

Hatch, supra note 76, at 1039.
2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61227.
Id. at 61208.
2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61211.
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be weakened because of growing institutional corruption.95 An example
of the effects of such distrust can be seen in the public’s cynical view
regarding the impact of campaign contributions.96 Similarly, the public
has perceived recent economic policies, such as the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (“TARP”), as primarily benefitting wealthy individuals
and large financial institutions, thereby weakening the public’s trust in
government institutions.97 Ultimately, the perception that certain
95. “Institutional corruption does not refer to the knowing violation of any law or
ethical rule . . . . It instead describes an influence, financial or otherwise, within an
economy of influence, that weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially by
weakening public trust in that institution.” Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens
United, BOSTON REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR35.5/lessig.php.
96. “The vast majority of Americans believe money buys results in Congress; less
than a quarter of Americans believe the institution worthy of their trust. When ‘freemarket’ Republicans vote to support milk subsidies or sugar tariffs, or when ‘proconsumer’ Democrats vote to exempt used-car dealers from consumer financialprotection legislation, it is easy to understand the mistrust and hard to believe that the
influence of money hasn’t weakened the ability of members to serve the principles, or
even the interests, they were elected to represent.” Lessig, supra note 95. See also
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (“[The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002] is the most recent federal enactment designed to purge national politics of
what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign
contributions.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
97. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Con
gress.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP] (“Notwithstanding TARP’s role in bringing the
financial system back from the brink of collapse, it has been widely reported that the
American people view TARP with anger, cynicism, and distrust . . . . The beliefs of
some, for example . . . that TARP was created in secrecy to transfer wealth from
taxpayers to Wall Street insiders . . . are only reinforced by Treasury’s failures of
transparency.”); PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS AND THE
NATIONAL JOURNAL, GOV’T ECONOMIC POLICIES SEEN AS BOON FOR BANKS AND BIG
BUSINESS, NOT MIDDLE CLASS OR POOR (The Society for Human Resource
Management 2010), available at http://people-press.org/report/637/ (“Fully 74% [of
respondents] say that government policies over the past two years have done a great
deal (53%) or a fair amount (21%) to help large banks and financial institutions.
Majorities also say that large corporations (70% great deal/fair amount) and wealthy
people (57% great deal/fair amount) have been helped. By contrast, 68% say
government policies have helped small businesses not at all (29%) or not too much
(39%); 68% also say middle-class people have received little or no help from these
policies. And about the same percentage (64%) says poor people have not been
helped.”); Sewell Chan, Both Parties Play the Wall Street Card, Sometimes from the
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policies favor the wealthy can undermine the public’s trust in
government.98
Moreover, the expressive message of such government distinctions
is potentially very powerful. “These expressive or symbolic dimensions
of policy are central in many regulatory contexts. They are just as real
and significant as other dimensions of policy.”99 In fact, “[m]any people
support law because of the statements made by law, and disagreements
about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law.”100
Thus, the expressive message conveyed by securities regulators in
making distinctions between different types of investors could, alone,
have harmful effects on those denied opportunities available to others.101
Bottom of the Deck, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A16,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/us/01wall.html?scp=4&sq=anger%20over%20bail
out&st=cse (explaining the trend during the 2010 Midterm Elections for candidates to
use anger against Wall Street bailouts and the economic stimulus against political
opponents).
98. See SIGTARP, supra note 97, at 165 (“Accuracy and transparency can enhance
the public’s understanding of and support for Government programs, whereas
statements that are less-than-careful or forthright — like those made in [communicating
about TARP] — may ultimately undermine the public’s understanding and support for
these same programs. This loss of public support could damage the Government’s
credibility and have long-term, unintended consequences that actually hamper the
Government’s ability to respond to crises.”); Frank Rich, Still the Best Congress Money
Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at WK8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/28/opinion/28rich.html (arguing that the recent dissatisfaction the public feels
with the government stems from the inability or unwillingness of Congress to deal with
the influence of “Big Money” in politics); Michael O’Brien, Sanders: ‘Big Money
Interests Control’ Congress, THE HILL, Dec. 22, 2009, available at
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/73311-sanders-big-money-interestscontrol-congress (quoting Sen. Bernie Sanders: “The truth is -- let me break the bad
news to the American people -- big money interests control the United States Congress.
That’s the reality. Some of us, for years . . . have been trying to give the working class,
middle class, low-income people some power. But the reality is, campaign contributions
-- What do you think? We bailed out Wall Street; we’re giving insurance companies,
drug companies breaks here.”).
99. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 70 (1995).
100. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022 (1996).
101. Expressive messages can have a negative effect when they constitute
expressive harms, such as a state or local government “communicat[ing] its contempt
for blacks by requiring the racial segregation of public facilities.” Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,
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Such harmful effects could take the form of less saving102 and
investment by the non-wealthy as well as greater perceptions of
unfairness and undemocratic government.

III. INFORMATION
If the goal is to expand opportunities to participate in financial
markets for the purpose of growing one’s wealth, the direct restrictions
imposed by regulation on access to institutions, such as hedge funds, are
only one barrier to entry. Another barrier, which the SEC has attempted
to tackle in numerous ways, is access to information. Dark pools and
flash orders are only one aspect of the larger problem of accessing and
comprehending the tremendous volume of information regarding
publicly listed companies, mutual funds, and financial institutions. The
SEC has tackled the problem of information barriers primarily through
disclosure requirements.103 Such an approach is consistent with an
efficiency/social welfare approach, which would predict that better
information would improve the functioning of markets, thereby
increasing social welfare. An opportunities-based approach, however,
recognizes that more information does not necessarily create more
opportunities for the majority of investors.
The disclosure requirements for publicly listed companies are
formidable. Large prospectuses provide detailed information on over
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000). This segregation sends a message that blacks are
inferior, and need to be separated from the “pure[r]” whites. Id. Desiring that the
government create a positive expressive message, many discriminating restaurant
owners supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964, wanting the law to help “shift social
norms and the social meaning of nondiscrimination,” where before it was not socially
acceptable to avoid discrimination. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 2043.
102. Sarah Molseed, An Ownership Society for All: Community Development
Financial Institutions as the Bridge Between Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building
Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 489, 500-01 (2006) (“Many asset-poor
individuals do not have access to the mainstream financial institutions, such as banks
and credit unions, that are essential to most asset accumulation. . . . The failure of many
low-income individuals to access mainstream financial institutions seriously
undermines any long-term asset accumulation.”).
103. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 4, at 417-18 (“A demanding system of mandatory
disclosure . . . makes up the core of the federal securities laws. . . . [B]y arming
investors with information, mandatory disclosure promotes informed investor decision
making, capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency.”).
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fifty items, including “business development and prospects, legal
proceedings, properties, financial performance, directors and officers,
and securities.”104 Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,105 companies are expected to include even more information
regarding off-balance sheet transactions, reconciliations of pro-forma
financial information with the registrant’s financial condition and results
of operation, insider stock transactions, internal control systems, codes
of ethics for senior financial officers, the audit committee’s financial
expert, and CEO and CFO certifications of financial statements.106 In
addition to these daunting disclosure requirements for individual
companies, mutual funds, in which most individuals invest their
retirement accounts, are required to disclose significant amounts of
information in their prospectuses. In particular, they must disclose all
costs, fees, and charges associated with a mutual fund in a variety of
ways.107 Additionally, mutual funds must provide a statement of the
fund’s investment objective and investment policies, including those
regarding the borrowing of money or the issuance of senior securities,
any involvement in the business of underwriting, the purchasing or
selling of real estate or commodities, any making of loans, the
concentration of their investment in particular industries, and the
particular securities that may be utilized in pursuit of the fund’s
investment objective.108
Does all of this mandatory disclosure actually increase the access of
individuals to the financial markets? The purpose of disclosure
requirements has been to combat the problems of asymmetric
information in the marketplace and thereby allow the markets to work

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 425.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
Paredes, supra note 4, at 428.
Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 926-27. In particular, mutual funds must
disclose all fees and charges associated with a mutual fund as a percentage of net assets,
the cost in dollars of an investment of $1,000 that earned the fund’s actual return and
incurred the fund’s actual expenses during that fiscal period, the costs in dollars based
on the fund’s actual expenses of a $1,000 investment that earned an assumed return of
five percent, and a narrative explanation of the types of costs charged to the fund. Id.
108. Riggs, Rosselot, & West, supra note 4, at 865-66. Additional disclosures
required include the operating policies of the fund, explaining how fund shares can be
purchased or redeemed, support services provided for investors, and any other features
that may be relevant to investment in the fund. Id. at 866.
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more efficiently.109 If investors know about the plans and financial wellbeing of different companies, the theory is that they will be more able to
channel capital efficiently.110 These determinations will, in turn, allow
investors to more accurately price assets on the market.111
The problem with the market failures approach to regulation – that
is, the provision of excessive information in order to combat the problem
of inadequate disclosures – is that it does not address the reality that
more information may have little or no value to investors. Individuals
are limited in their ability to absorb and process large amounts of
information.112 The Nobel laureate Herb Simon recognized the
“bounded rationality” of individuals.113 This theory recognizes that
individuals are limited in their ability to process and optimally utilize all
available information and, instead, will satisfice.114 Even experts cannot
process all of the information they are given.115 In fact, more
109. Paredes, supra note 4, at 470-71 (explaining the “lemons market,” caused by
asymmetric information, in which sellers offer inferior products because they have
more information about the low quality of these products than the buyers, leading
buyers to withdraw from the market, a problem mitigated when companies are required
to disclose accurate information to consumers).
110. Paredes, supra note 4, at 471 (“[T]his commitment [to provide comprehensive,
quality, and truthful disclosures indefinitely] is important because investors want
assurances that they will have access to the information necessary to value a company’s
securities.”).
111. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 930 (explaining that providing information to
consumers can lower prices by facilitating product comparison and increasing
competition).
112. Paredes, supra note 4, at 435 (“Cognitive capabilities are scarce resources that
have to be allocated; because of limited cognitive capabilities, people cannot attend to
all the information made available to them and cannot evaluate all their choices
perfectly.”).
113. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99,
101 (1955) (“[S]ome of the constraints that must be taken as givens in an optimization
problem may be physiological and psychological limitations of the organism
(biologically defined) itself. For example, the maximum speed at which an organism
can move establishes a boundary on the set of its available behavior alternatives.
Similarly, limits on computational capacity may be important constraints entering into
the definition of rational choice under particular circumstances.”).
114. Paredes, supra note 4, at 436. In satisficing, people choose a satisfactory
outcome as their “aspiration level,” and then work towards reaching this outcome, even
if some better decision may exist in theory. Id. In other words, because individuals do
not have the cognitive capabilities to optimize, they try to do “the best as [they] can
under the circumstances.” Id.
115. Id. at 455 (“[E]verybody – experts and non-experts alike – has limited
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information can potentially cause individuals to make worse
decisions.116 This is because greater amounts of information make it
more difficult for individuals to rank which piece of information is most
important.117 Additionally, investors may turn to heuristic rules of
thumb, which may lead them to make errors.118 Under the availability
heuristic, investors place too much weight on more recent and salient
information.119
Information about individual companies may not be as relevant to

cognitive abilities. A vast behavioral finance literature suggests that securities market
professionals, like lay investors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases that affect
investment decisions.”).
116. Id. at 419 (“Studies show that at some point, people become overloaded with
information and make worse decisions than if less information were made available to
them.”). For examples of such studies, see David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh,
Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting 2 (Sept. 2003)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=334940 (“[I]nformation that is presented in salient, easily
processed form is assumed to be absorbed more easily than information that is less
salient, or that is only implicit in the public information set. . . . Thus, investors neglect
relevant aspects of the economic environments they face. For example, investors may
neglect the distinctive features of different divisions of a diversified firm, or may not
adequately adjust their interpretations of disclosures to take into account the strategic
incentives of firms to manipulate observers’ perceptions.”); Russell Korobkin, The
Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts,
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 52-55 (1999)
(arguing that numerous choices in healthcare coverage options can cause individuals to
select simpler, less accurate decision-making processes in order to handle the amount of
information they have to process); Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information
Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 437
(1984) (“In real life, consumers are often faced with large amounts and a wide variety
of information, which is so prevalent and obtrusive in the environment. Although
consumers develop mechanisms for limiting their intake of information, their limited
processing capacity can become cognitively overloaded if they attempt to process ‘too
much’ information in a limited time, and this can result in confusion, cognitive strain,
and other dysfunctional consequences.”).
117. Paredes, supra note 4, at 441. Each decision an individual is choosing between
contains several attributes that are relevant to the consideration of the decision and that
influence which alternative to choose. Id. at 437. The more attributes per choice, the
closer individuals get to becoming mentally overloaded and making worse decisions.
Id. at 441.
118. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 110 (2006).
119. Id.
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the unsophisticated individual investor as is information about mutual
funds. Of the 117.2 million U.S. households in 2009, 43%, or 50.4
million total households, owned mutual funds.120 These households
represent 87.1 million individual mutual fund shareholders.121 The type
of information that is likely to matter, therefore, for individual investors
pertains to the risk, return, and fees of a mutual fund.
An opportunities-based policy might require that risk and return
measures be incorporated by providing detailed descriptions of a mutual
fund’s past performance (monthly, quarterly, and annual in order for
individuals to see the volatility of the fund over time), the types of assets
in which it invests, and how its performance compares to a standard
index, such as the S&P 500. In fact, mutual funds already make such
disclosures and are required to do so under rules and amendments
adopted in 2004 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
Regulation S-X.122 What would assist investors further is if the
performance of mutual funds was compared in an accessible format to
those of others of the same type and to mutual funds overall.123 This
could be done for risk and return. Simple explanations showing what
the individual’s investment would be in ten years if it continued to grow
at the current rate of return, a historical average rate of return, or an
alternative rate of return could assist investors in obtaining a more
complete understanding of their current investments. Risk measures
would be far more difficult to compare, but representing investment
gains for different plausible return levels could be a great benefit to
investors.
The SEC has also regulated mutual funds with respect to fee

120. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS
3, 2009 (Winter 2010).
121. Id. at 1.
122. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26372, 69
Fed. Reg. 11244 (Mar. 9, 2004).
123. See Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 935-37 (arguing for the reporting of
expenses by mutual funds to be done in a way that leads to easy comparison by
investors, such as requiring funds to calculate their expense ratio relative to other funds
in their comparable investment classification and to report this to the SEC); Paredes,
supra note 4, at 476 (supporting the continued use of charts, graphs, and tables in SEC
filings so that information is presented in a more easily digestible way).
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disclosures.124 Mutual funds are required to disclose transactional fees
(the sales loads and redemption fees), as well as management fees and
12b-1 fees (fees for marketing and distribution activities).125 Fee
disclosure requirements, however, fail to give investors a comparative
basis for their costs. When investors only see the costs associated with
the fund in which they are investing, they have no means to evaluate
whether the price of their investment is justified.126 Such a lack of
comparative information makes it more difficult for the investors in
mutual funds to monitor their cost and quality.127 While the SEC’s
online fee calculator is a helpful step in the right direction,128 measures
that require investors to take initiative and do extra work are far less
effective than providing the information directly in an easily accessible
format.129
Simplification of information allows more individuals to access the
financial markets in ways that will effectively increase their wealth. For
instance, individuals may be paying more fees for the same types of
passively managed index funds without knowing it because the

124. See Consolidated Disclosure of Mutual Fund Expenses, Investment Company
Act Release No. 16244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192 (Feb. 4, 1988) (“Investment Company Act
Release”).
125. Id.; Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 925-27; Investment Company Act Release,
supra note 124.
126. Cf. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 936 (“[P]roviding operating expense and
return disclosures in a truly comparative framework is much more likely to elicit an
informed choice on the part of investors than if operating expenses or return disclosures
are made in isolation.”).
127. See id. at 937 (Having information comparing a fund to other comparable funds
makes it more likely that directors will engage in proper oversight of their fund’s
services and fees because “[c]onsistent with the wise maxim that you manage what is
measured, the independent directors are far more likely to probe the causes for aboveaverage expense ratios than when not aware that the fund’s expense ratio is above
average.”).
128. See Calculating Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n
(Aug. 10, 2010) http://sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm. This resource from the
SEC allows for the comparison of the fees and expenses of up to three mutual funds, up
to three ETFs, or the share classes of the same mutual fund, on FINRA’s Mutual Fund
Expense Analyzer. All that is needed is the full name of the fund or its ticker symbol,
but you can also search for this information using key words.
129. See Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 932 (“Because processing of information is
costly, people tend to accept information in the format in which it is given rather than
expending cognitive effort to transform it.”).
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information is too complex for them to absorb in a timely way.130
Mandating mutual funds to provide expense ratios, the expense ratio
range for the comparable group, and the percentile ranking of their
expense ratio within this group, would greatly reduce the information
costs associated with pricing in the mutual fund market.131
This idea is analogous to what has been discussed by Professor
Elizabeth Warren in promoting disclosures of credit card terms.132
Under the Credit Card Act of 2009, credit cards must now clearly
disclose, the timing necessary to pay the balance of a credit card bill if
the minimum payment is made (including the total cost of doing so as
well as the minimum monthly payment required to pay off the balance
within 36 months), as well as information about late payments
(including the date after which such a fee will be charged and any
increase in the interest rate for late payments), and an electronic method
for credit card disclosures to become available.133 This information must

130. In one study, over eighty percent of respondents believed that higher
maintenance charges signified a better performing fund. In a more detailed study, a
sample of fifty-two S&P 500 index funds showed that those with poorer performance
had higher distribution costs and yet grew their customer base at a higher rate than
lower-cost funds. The biggest portion of the difference in performance between funds
is attributable to the higher management expenses and costs. This problem could be
impacted by the fact that individuals are not receiving enough information to make
good comparisons among products, or that the information is not being presented in a
way that makes it processible enough to make rational decisions. See id. at 909-11.
131. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 936.
132. See Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation,
HARVARD MAGAZINE, May-June 2008, at 34 (suggesting the development of a Financial
Product Safety Commission that would establish guidelines for consumer disclosure,
collect and report data about the uses of different financial products, judge the safety of
new products, and require the modification of products judged as dangerous to
consumers, in order to ensure that credit cards and other financial products are
sufficient to meet “minimum safety standards” and that uniform disclosures would
make it easy for consumers to compare products); Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing
Consumer Financial Products Regulation Before the House Financial Services
Committee, 111th Cong. 5 (June 24, 2009) (testimony of Elizabeth Warren, Leo
Gottlieb
Professor
of
Law,
Harvard
Law
School),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/warren_testimony.pdf
[hereinafter Regulatory Restructuring] (arguing that credit card companies should be
required to provide uniform information about “the interest rate, the penalty rate, when
a penalty will be imposed, and how to get the free gift” on a two-page document in
order to facilitate product comparison by consumers).
133. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
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be provided in an easily accessible format. Warren has further proposed
having a simple, two-page long credit card contract that is clear, easy to
read, and highlights key information (interest rate, penalty rate, when
penalties are assessed, and how to get free gifts) in a straightforward
way.134 Each lender would have a similar contract where it would fill in
the blanks with its company’s information, creating a quick and easy
way for consumers to compare competitors.135 Such a proposal, if
applied to mutual funds, would help investors better accomplish one of
the primary goals of disclosure – to discriminate on the basis of
quality.136
It is not necessary for the SEC to eliminate any of its current
disclosure requirements. Eliminating some disclosure requirements
could have costs, such as omitting information that is more useful than
what remains disclosed, taking away information that may be useful to
some market participants but not others, and eroding investor confidence
by making the market seem less regulated and therefore more prone to
fraud and inefficiency.137 Providing a two-tiered system of information,
however, could be a good way to offer summary information that an
individual investor could easily understand.138 For mutual funds, this
could consist of graphics that show the mutual fund’s costs and
performance relative to others in its category and as compared to mutual
funds as a whole.
For individual companies, it may be more difficult to determine the
most important information that an investor should have. If the goal of
134.
135.

Regulatory Restructuring, supra note 132, at 5.
Id. (“Picture it—a credit card contract that is two pages long, clear and easy to
read, and that has a few well-lit blanks—the interest rate, the penalty rate, when a
penalty will be imposed, and how to get the free gift. Each lender can decide how to fill
in the blanks for the cards it wants to sell, and each customer can make quick
comparisons to see who is offering the best deals.”)
136. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 470 (describing the securities market as having a
“lemons problem,” where “the challenge for buyers is to identify quality, which buyers
have difficulty doing without the necessary information to distinguish between superior
and inferior items or the ability otherwise to determine quality at a reasonable cost”).
137. See id. at 450, 460, 462.
138. See id. at 461 (advocating a disclosure system in which one set of disclosures is
provided to experts, while a different set of disclosures is provided to the ordinary
investor). This tiered form of disclosure is useful in that it provides the information
most useful for two very different types of investors in the way that is most
understandable to them, which for individual investors could be a simplified version of
the most important general information.
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policy is to promote the expansion of opportunity in wealth
accumulation, the greatest gains in achieving this goal are likely to be
derived from beginning with the types of investments made by the most
people and assisting them to gain as much as possible from them. This
approach would likely result in a focus on mutual funds and pension
funds.139 The majority of investors in individual companies are
institutional investors140 who, though still limited in their cognitive
abilities, have better resources to help process and summarize large
volumes of information about individual companies.141
What information is most relevant and how it should be presented
may require empirical research into what information is most easily
processed and used by investors.142 In sum, the notions underlying
regulation in the form of mandating many disclosures may be founded
on a myth:
A fair amount of what the Commission does . . . is in the name of
139. In 2009, an estimated 87 million individual investors owned mutual funds and
held 84 percent of total mutual fund assets at year-end. Altogether, 50.4 million
households, or 43 percent of all U.S. households, owned funds. Mutual funds
represented a significant component of many U.S. households’ financial holdings in
2009. Among households owning mutual funds, the median amount invested in mutual
funds was $80,000. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACT BOOK 80 (2009). “[O]ver 50 percent of pension fund investments are undertaken
through the purchase of shares in mutual funds . . . .” WORLD BANK, Private Capital
Flows to Developing Countries: The Road to Financial Integration 129 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1997).
140. Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 801 (2010) (“Institutional investors have become very
common and now account for the vast majority of shareholding, but they have failed to
actively participate in corporate governance.”).
141. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 455 (“Although the risk of information overload
may be eased for experts, it is not eliminated.”). However, securities market
professionals can learn from past mistakes and often gain valuable experience over
time. Id. In addition, experts can work with other individuals to help by hiring people,
dividing tasks, and allocating resources. Id. “In large part, the expert filters are in
reality collections of individuals housed in financial institutions that can bring lots of
human and other resources to bear on a task.” Id.
142. Id. at 473-74 (advocating for further research, such as interviews, surveys,
laboratory experiments, or the study of historical data to expand existing behavioral
finance literature and to determine how individuals process information and make
investment decisions, particularly looking at the level of information overload for
different securities market participants and what information is most useful and should
be disclosed).
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making disclosure “accessible” to the average investor. That
sentiment has led to the creation of an awkward myth-story in which
probably few have deep faith. In this story, the typical retail investor
is very much an earnest and rational person, but with bounded
capacity. He wants a substantial amount of government-mandated
disclosure and evaluates it fairly carefully in making his investment
decision so long as it is packaged properly (e.g., in “plain English”).
To be sure, some investors actually do this. But the Commission has
never studied investor behavior deeply enough to say, publicly at
least, what percentage of investors read or understand these
documents, or what influence the fundamental analysis-oriented
disclosure has on their investment decisions. We now know from
research in behavioral economics that this belief is unfounded.
143
Regulatory policy needs to evolve to reflect that reality.

Thus, an opportunities-based perspective, unlike a social welfare
approach, demands not that more information be provided, but rather
that the most relevant information for the majority of investors be
provided in as accessible a format as possible.

IV. SAVING US FROM OURSELVES
A host of behavioral biases that impact investment behavior
compounds the problem of information overload.144 Such biases are
examples of irrational behaviors that are not taken into account in
traditional economic models.145 Consequently, the traditional social
143. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 173 (2002).
144. See infra Parts A-C.
145. “For most of the past two centuries, economic thinking has been dominated by
the concept of Homo economicus. The hypothetical Economic Man knows what he
wants; his preferences can be expressed mathematically in terms of a ‘utility function.’
And his choices are driven by rational calculations about how to maximize that
function: whether consumers are deciding between corn flakes or shredded wheat, or
investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those decisions are assumed to be
based on comparisons of the ‘marginal utility,’ or the added benefit the buyer would get
from acquiring a small amount of the alternatives available.” Paul Krugman, Who Was
Milton Friedman?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-miltonfriedman/?pagination=false.
See also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL,
REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION xix (Harper Perennial 2009) (“In this book, when I
mention the rational economic model, I refer to the basic assumption that most
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welfare approach would not acknowledge them as one of the standard
market failures to be addressed by government intervention.
Nevertheless, these behavioral biases have significant impacts on
investors. They lead traders to trade too frequently (thereby reducing
their returns by what they incur in fees),146 refuse to realize their losses
when they should,147 and misjudge the probability of events.148
Regulation can facilitate wealth accumulation by assisting investors in
mitigating the impacts of their own biases on their investment behaviors.
In this section I will describe three types of biases and some
opportunities-based regulatory proposals that might help investors be
less negatively impacted by their own biases.
A. OVERCONFIDENCE
One behavioral bias that has been well documented is
overconfidence, or over-optimism.149 Overconfidence leads to excessive

economists and many of us hold about human nature – the simple and compelling idea
that we are capable of making the right decisions for ourselves.”).
146. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.
147. This behavior is defined as “loss aversion,” a behavioral trait that causes
individuals to “continue [to hold] a losing position in hopes of reversing their losses
without regard to disclosure.” Id. at 22.
148. Id. at 16.
149. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279, 316 (2000) (“[I]nvestors may act with overconfidence, placing too
little weight on low-probability risks and justifying their prior decisions even when
misguided. Similarly, investors may act with ‘hindsight bias,’ placing too much weight
on past performance in projecting future performance.”) (citing Jonathan Clements,
Riskphobes are Taking Two Big Gambles, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at C1); Choi,
supra note 118, at 110 (“Investors may make decisions with overconfidence or
overoptimism. Male investors in particular may trade excessively in securities.”); Choi
& Pritchard, supra note 36 at 12 (“Commentators have argued that investors often do
not recognize how difficult [the choices they face] are and instead rely on a belief that
their innate abilities will lead to a good investment result.”); Langevoort, supra note
143, at 146 (“[P]erhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that
people are overconfident. . . . This bias has a comparative dimension to it: people are
overconfident in their skills vis-à-vis others. Indeed, far more than fifty percent of a
sampling of active investors will rate themselves as above average as compared to their
peers at the task of investing.”); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of
the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 166 (2006) (“Investors . . . can be overconfident in
their abilities to assess risks and to make wise investment decisions. Most investors
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trading and a reduction in returns due to transaction fees.150 One study
examined the investment performance of a large number of online
brokerage accounts,151 which are held by those who think that they can
make their own trading decisions without the assistance of a stockbroker
providing advice. This group has been the fastest growing segment of
the brokerage industry over the last few years.152 What the researchers
found is that the rate of trading increased once the accounts were
established, especially after an initial spurt of good performance (or
good luck).153 Notwithstanding this increasing volume of trading,
overall average performance lagged behind what a more passive, welldiversified trading strategy would generate.154 All of the lag could be
traced to the costs (e.g., commissions) associated with active trading.155
Simply put, “[o]verconfident investors will overestimate the value of
their private information, causing them to trade too actively and,
consequently, to earn below-average returns.”156
Other evidence regarding overconfidence relates to investor
behavior during bull markets. The number of day traders increased as
the bull market peaked in the late 1990s.157 Day traders are able to place
their trades directly online, giving them a sense of empowerment and
control, which can exacerbate their overconfidence.158
The
overconfident behavior of day traders has been likened to a “new form

overrate their stock-picking abilities and believe that their investment skills are above
average. Studies have shown that investors consistently overestimate both the future
performance and the past performance of their investments.”); Simon Gervais &
Terrance Odean, Learning To Become Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 1 (2001)
(‘“Traders who successfully forecast next period dividends improperly update their
beliefs; they overweight the possibility that their success was due to superior ability. In
so doing they become overconfident.”).
150. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12. See also Nisha Patel, IX. ETFs and
Mutual Funds: Changes in the Industry, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 345, 348-49
(2008) (“[When] the investor makes small, frequent investments . . . the fee is applied to
each transaction, amounting to heavy broker fees.”).
151. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000).
152. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147.
153. Id. at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800.
154. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800.
155. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800.
156. Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800.
157. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.
158. Ripken, supra note 149, at 167.
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of casino gambling” that has caused these traders to “frequently los[e]
family savings and [go] into debt, essentially eliminating their own
retirement incomes.”159 This type of trading can also be detrimental to
the market as a whole, making it more volatile and stock prices more
artificial, rising and falling on a measure of “consumer confidence”
rather than any actual change in the value of the company.160
A third example of overconfident behavior is that investors believe
that they know more about the value of their employer’s stock than the
rest of the market. Their overconfidence leads investors to believe that
their own company is better than others and as a result will perform
better in the market.161 Hence, they invest heavily in their employer’s
stock, which is an obvious mistake from a diversification perspective.162
More than 20% of defined contribution pension money is invested in the
employer’s stock.163 When employees believe their company is doing
well financially and are optimistic about their company’s future
prospects, they may have additional emotional reasons to invest heavily
in their employer’s stock: euphoria, exuberance, greed, and general
feelings of positivity, well-being, or goodness.164 An example of this
behavior leading to disastrous consequences was displayed in the case of
Enron employees investing too heavily in Enron stock, and suffering
substantial losses as a result.165

159. Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage:
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform The Social
Security Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1416 (2001).
160. Id. at 1416-17.
161. Ripken, supra note 149, at 164.
162. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.
163. Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401 (k) Plans, 50 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47
(2007) (“[S]ome 11 million participants in U.S. defined-contribution plans have more
than 20 percent of their account balance invested in company stock. Within this group,
some 5 million have more than 60 percent of their account balance concentrated in their
employer’s stock.”). See also Gur Huberman and Paul Sengmueller, Performance and
Employer Sock in 401(k) Plans, 8 REV. FIN. 403, 404 (2004) (finding that for 401(k)
plans that offer company stock as an investment choice, individuals invest 36.3% in
company stock). Respondents to a Gallup survey view their own employer’s stock as
safer than a diversified stock fund, domestic or international. Gur Huberman,
Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 660 (2001).
164. Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1059, 1092 (2003).
165. See Id. at 1093; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim
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B. FRAMING
A second cognitive bias in the behavioral literature that results in
several distinct investment behaviors is framing.166 People appear to
approach risk-taking differently depending on the framing of the choice
before them.167When evaluating a potential gain, people exhibit a strong
degree of risk aversion.168At the same time, if investors are prompted to
see the choice as one of trying to avoid a loss of something that is
currently possessed, they tend to be more risk-seeking.169As a result of
framing effects, people may hold on to their losing stocks too long, and
sell their winners too readily.170 An investor may sell winners too
readily in a “quest for pride,” as closing a stock account at a gain
induces a feeling of pride, and may hold a loser too long in an effort to
avoid a feeling of regret from closing an account at a loss.171 Selling
winners too readily can have a negative impact on an individual for tax
purposes, because short-term gains are taxed at a higher rate than longterm gains.172 Nevertheless, perhaps because regret is stronger than
pride, and can be experienced on either side of the market (if the
investor sells a winner too early, it can also create a feeling of regret
later on if the price continues to rise), inaction is favored over action,
and an investor is more likely to hold a stock than to sell it.173 Thus,
when investors’ stocks have lost value, they may hold on to the stocks
as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E0DC143AF931A15752C1A9679C8B63&pagewanted=1
(indicating that at the end of 2000, more than half of the Enron 401(k)’s $2.1 billion
value consisted of Enron stock, which, by November 2001, lost 94% of its value.).
166. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144. “[A] frame is a central organizing idea or
story line that provides meaning; it suggests what the controversy is about, the essence
of the issue.” Paul R. Brewer and Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens’
Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929,
931 (2005) (quoting W. A. Gamson & A. Modigliani, The Changing Political Culture of
Affirmative Action 143 in 3 Research in political sociology (R. D. Braungart, ed.,
1987)).
167. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Terrence Odean, Are Investors Reluctant To Realize Their Losses?,
53 J. FIN. 1775 (1998); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition To Sell Winners
Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985).
171. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 170, at 782.
172. Id. at 778, 786.
173. Id. at 782.
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longer than warranted in hope of reversing the losses.174 This loss
aversion may lead investors to hold on to losing stocks longer than
optimal from a tax planning perspective.175 Conversely, investors that
make large investment gains may not value the gains as highly as the
principal, leading them to take on excessive risk with their gains
(treating the gains much like “house” money in a casino).176
C. MISJUDGING PROBABILITIES
More generally, investors are often simply poor judges of
probabilities.177 Investors may under weigh low probability, high
magnitude risks if no obvious examples of the risks have recently been
brought to their attention.178 By contrast, once a big event happens –
such as the Enron scandal – investors may overreact, unduly
emphasizing the risk of fraud.179 Immediately after the Enron and
WorldCom scandals in the United States, the net volume of money
flowing into mutual funds turned negative for a period of time, even
though the holders of diversified mutual funds were unlikely to suffer
any significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular
company.180 Money managers may also discount small, low probability
risks and act overconfidently, as they are also subject to behavioral
174.
175.

Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 13.
See id. See also Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144; Odean, supra note 170
(reporting that despite tax advantages investors were more willing to sell winning
positions than losing ones); Shefrin & Statman, supra note 170, at 785-88.
176. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 13. See also Nicholas Barberis, Ming
Huang & Tano Santos, Prospect Theory and Asset Prices, 66 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2001)
(arguing that risk aversion will be reduced after the revelation of good news that
increases the price of a stock); Richard Thaler & E.J. Johnson, Gambling with the
House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky
Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 199 (1990) (finding that people are more willing to take on risks
with money that was recently won).
177. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Peter Klibanoff, Owen Lamony & Thierry A. Wizman, Investor
Reaction to Salient News in Closed-end Country Funds, 53 J. FIN. 673 (1999) (finding
that investors react more strongly to prominent events, defined as those reported on the
front page of the New York Times).
180. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12 (citing Shaheen Pasha, Redemptions
Aren’t Lone Villain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at D13 (reporting that “investors pulled
a net $28.47 billion from stock funds in July, beating even the $23.6 billion in
withdrawals that . . . were made in September following the terrorist attacks”)).
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biases.181 For example, when failing to meet a perceived benchmark, a
money manager may take an overly risky position in an attempt to
“catch up.”182 Money managers are also subject to several other biases,
including underreacting to unfavorable information and overreacting to
favorable information.183
D. A ROLE FOR REGULATORY NUDGES
In sum, some of the ways in which investors reduce their prospects
for wealth accumulation are by trading too frequently,184 holding on to
losses when they should accept sunk costs,185 being excessively risky
with their gains,186 and overreacting to new information.187 The impacts
of all of these behavioral biases could be mitigated with regulatory
nudges in ways that could enhance wealth accumulation.188 In a free
market system, we should preserve the rights of investors to make the
decisions they wish to make based on the information they have or
believe they have, whether accurate or not.189 Regulation can, however,
181.
182.

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for
Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84
CAL. L. REV. 627, 643 (1996) (“A string of losses can cause the agent to assume more
risk simply to get back to even, especially if failure to do so might result in termination
and severe reputational penalty.”).
183. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 18.
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. See supra Part IV.B.
186. See supra Part IV.B.
187. See supra Part IV.C.
188. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 72 (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (stating that in
order to protect people from making irrational blunders, they should be offered “nudges
that are most likely to help and least likely to inflict harm”). See id. at 81-100
(providing examples of different scenarios that are likely to produce errors leading to
suboptimal outcomes, along with potential “nudges” as solutions to prevent or mitigate
these errors).
189. See Allison Clare Gordon, The “Day Trading” Phenomenon: An Educated
Investment or a Day at the Casino?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 353, 375 (2001) (“Most
opponents, including Senator Phil Gramm, the Senate Banking Committee Chairman,
contest the regulatory proposal, because ‘[y]ou can’t protect people from making bad
decisions.’ Moreover, such regulations encroach on investors’ freedom and privacy.”);
John H. Walsh, Can Regulation Protect “Suckers” and “Fools” From Themselves?
Reflections on the Rhetoric of Investors and Investor Protection Under the Federal
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use certain tools to prompt investors in the event that they are prone to
behavioral biases to which they would like to be less prone.190
Simple regulatory devices could be of great benefit to investors.
For example, when individuals sign up for a brokerage account, they
could be asked to pre-commit, even if this is not a binding commitment,
to no more than a certain number of trades per month or to remain
within a certain cap of trading fees per month.191 Each time they trade
they could be reminded of their limit and of how many trades/fees they
have left relative to their pre-committed cap. This pre-commitment need
not be binding because investors may have extenuating circumstances –
investors may need to liquidate their funds and have the right to do so –
but such a device would remind investors of the investment decisions
they previously made. It could serve as a nudge to reconsider before
Securities Laws, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 188, 239 (2008) (“In a true free market . . .
investors are responsible for their own decisions, good or bad. This responsibility leads
them to vigorously analyze companies before they invest, using independent financial
analysts. In our heavily regulated environment, however, investors and analysts equate
SEC compliance with reputability. The more we look to the government to protect us
from investment mistakes, the less competition there is for truly independent
evaluations of investment risk.”); Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to
Take for Granted: Minimum Standards For the Legal Framework of a Free and
Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 143 (2008) (“Under the theory of
liberty championed by John Stuart Mill, individuals are best suited to determine what is
in their own interest; it is a violation of autonomy for courts or legislatures to act
paternalistically to protect individuals from their own mistakes on the ground that these
government officials know better than individuals what is in their best interest. The
ability of individuals to choose their own ends and to determine the course of their own
lives is fundamental to liberty.”).
190. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 52 (noting that “[l]arger institutional
investors may have enough self-awareness of their own susceptibility to behavioral
biases to appreciate a regime that protects them against such biases”). Regulation can
be desirable to many individuals, if it can encourage them to make better choices. For
example, “many smokers, drinkers, and overeaters are willing to pay third parties to
help them make better decisions.” Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 7. “When
people have a hard time predicting how their choices will end up affecting their lives,
they have less to gain by numerous options and perhaps even by choosing for
themselves. A nudge might be welcomed.” Id. at 76.
191. The fees associated with the number of trades could speedily accumulate. For
example, in addition to the annual $20 account service fee, Vanguard’s standard
brokerage services account charges $7 for each of the first 25 trades, and $20 for each
trade thereafter.
See Schedules VANGARD BROKERAGE SERVICES
COMMISSION AND FEE SCHEDULES, available at https://personal.vanguard.com/
us/whatweoffer/stocksbondscds/feescommissions (last visited Nov. 24, 2010).
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engaging in unnecessary trading.
A similar commitment device applying to both brokerage fund and
mutual fund accounts could prompt investors to determine how much of
a loss they are willing to tolerate and at what gain they would like to
sell. Alternatively, investors could commit to invest in a particular
portfolio for a set period and pre-commit to a penalty if they withdraw
early. Investors should be prompted to make these decisions at the
initiation of an investment account. If investors do not respond to a
prompt pertaining to a certain amount of gain or loss in the portfolio
within a specified amount of time, they could be required to decide
ahead of time whether the investments should continue or gains and
losses should be realized.
These commitment devices are not unlike the options individuals
now have vis-à-vis debt instruments. With respect to credit cards,
individuals can choose to have their credit card payments automatically
deducted from their bank account in the amount of the minimum
payment or in the amount of the total balance due.192 The rationale for
such commitment devices in the credit card context is that by simply
allowing or recommending payment of the minimum balance,
individuals may become anchored to pay only the minimum, which
maximizes interest charges over time, rather than making the alternative
decision to pay off the full bill and minimize interest charges.193 In the
same way, investors could become anchored to hold on to their
investments as long as the market prices are within some predetermined
range of movement. Such simple pre-commitment devices could help
mitigate the problems of over-reaction to news. If investors are within
their target price range for a stock, for instance, a range of not selling if
within twenty percent above or below their initial purchase price, then
they may be less likely to decide to purchase more stock on the
availability of good news or to sell at the appearance of bad news, as
192. See, e.g., Dawn Allcot, How To: Automatically Pay Your Credit Card Bill
Each Month, CREDITSHOUT BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010)), http //creditshout.com(stating that
most credit card companies offer the option to have the bill automatically paid from a
checking account each month, either by the minimum payment, statement ending
balance, or another fixed amount).
193. Thaler and Sunstein make the point that individuals already receive a “nudge”
from companies to simply pay the minimum balance each month. They propose that
the government require companies to provide the alternative option of paying of the full
amount each month, so as to “nudge” individuals to minimize their interest charges.
See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 144.
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they know that they will be prompted when they reach their own
personal trigger point for a decision. They may be less likely to feel the
need to react to the news when they get it. While this result could lead
to an under reaction bias,194 the extent of this bias is likely to depend on
the range of pre-commitment options individuals select. Regulations
proposed on a pilot basis coupled with empirical research would provide
excellent opportunities to study the effects of experimenting with
various pre-commitment devices. If such pre-commitment devices save
individuals transaction costs and promote more thoughtful, long-term
investing, then they would serve the goal of promoting wealth
accumulation across different sectors of society.

V. INCENTIVES FOR FINANCIAL ADVISERS AND MANAGERS
In order to promote opportunities for wealth accumulation,
securities regulation must take into account the reality that a majority of
retail investors delegate their investment decisions to financial
professionals.195 They do so by investing in mutual funds, investing in
pension funds, relying on money managers, and occasionally, for high
net worth individuals, investing in hedge funds.196 Their wealth
194. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144 (defining this phenomenon as based on
cognitive conservatism: an extremely robust behavioral construct showing that people
change their views slowly even in the face of persuasive evidence, or people cling as
long as possible to what they previously believed to be true).
195. Sixty percent of U.S. households reported that they had an employer-sponsored
retirement plan—that is, they had assets in DC plan accounts, were receiving or
expecting to receive benefits from DB plans, or both. Eighty million, or 68 percent, of
U.S. households reported that they had employer-sponsored retirement plans, IRAs, or
both in May 2009. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACT BOOK 96 (2009). At year-end 2009, total IRA assets totaled $4.2 trillion. Id. at
98. Mutual fund assets held in IRAs were $2.0 trillion, and assets managed by mutual
funds were the largest component of IRA assets, followed by the securities held directly
through brokerage accounts ($1.5 trillion). Id. The mutual fund industry’s share of the
IRA market increased to an estimated 46 percent at year-end 2009. Id. Investors held
roughly the same amount of mutual fund assets in IRAs as they did in employersponsored DC plans. Id. at 114. Among investors owning mutual fund shares outside
of retirement plans at work, 77 percent own fund shares through professional financial
advisers. Id. at 68.
196. See Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, Securities Act Release No.
9128, 75 Fed. Reg. 47064, 47065 (Aug. 4, 2010) (proposed July 21, 2010) (“More than
87 million Americans, representing slightly less than half of all households, own mutual
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accumulation, therefore, depends in great part on the behavior of these
financial professionals. The behavior of these professionals, in turn,
depends on the performance incentives they face - namely how they are
paid.197
While a social welfare approach to regulation would say that
government intervention is only needed to mitigate principal-agent
problems by, for instance, mandating disclosure by various financial
agents to their investor principals,198 an opportunities-based perspective
would deem the provision of information insufficient to promote wealth
accumulation. If the majority of the middle and lower income segments
of society are relying on financial professionals to help them accumulate
wealth, then a goal of securities regulation should be to promote
incentives that better serve the wealth accumulation of these groups. In
many cases, the current incentives of financial professionals favor their
own wealth accumulation over that of their clients.
For instance, the performance of most mutual fund managers and
other financial professionals is assessed, in terms of the fees they collect,

funds . . . [and] most fund investors buy through intermediaries.”); SEC Release No.
IA-2107, Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/ic-25925.htm (proposed Feb. 5, 2003) (noting
that “millions of investors . . . invest in funds, participate in pension funds managed by
investment advisers, or use the services of a personal financial planner or money
manager,” and that 5,030 funds and 7,790 advisers are currently registered with the
SEC, collectively control[ling] over $21 trillion of assets, and engag[ing] in tens of
millions of transactions each year); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282 (2009)
(“That most individuals cannot invest in hedge funds, however, has not hurt their
popularity. The assets managed by hedge funds have grown at stratospheric rates, from
$40 billion in 1990 to more than $1.7 trillion in 2007.”).
197. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 877 (1992) (stating that money managers have
incentives to improve portfolio performance to increase asset-based management fees);
D. Bruce Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v.
Harris, 35 J. CORP. L. 561, 608 (2010) (stating that mutual fund advisers will put more
effort into picking stocks when incentive fees are used to condition compensation on
investment performance); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:
The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 995
(2006) (noting that it is “reasonable for investors to depend on the manager’s
performance fee to help align the manager’s incentives with the best interests of the
fund’s investors”).
198. See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 1048.
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on no lengthier period than on an annual basis.199 Investors are provided
with quarterly reports for mutual fund performance relative to some
benchmark, such as the S&P 500.200 Mutual fund advisers are typically
compensated with a fee based on the percentage of total assets under
their management.201 Each year, mutual funds can charge performance
fees based on by how much they outperform their benchmark as long as
their fees decline symmetrically when they underperform that
benchmark.202 The benchmark, however, is generally assessed on an
annual basis.203
Other financial professionals, including banking and finance
executives, are also generally compensated on the basis of short-term
performance.204 The problem with having financial professionals paid
on the basis of a shorter time horizon is that they are incentivized to take
199. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder
Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 997
(1992) (“[B]ecause compensation schemes for institutional investors are frequently tied
to annual investment return, rather than long-term investment performance, it is
possible that investment managers trade in an attempt to maximize the annual return by
capturing appreciation in their portfolio selections.”).
200. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, 69 Fed. Reg.
11244 (Mar. 9, 2004).
201. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1363 (1991).
202. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (1988).
See also INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE FEES AND EXPENSE RATIOS,
12 FUNDAMENTALS 1, 2 (Aug. 2003) (“With performance fee arrangements, the advisory
fee rate is increased whenever the fund’s return exceeds a stated benchmark over a
specified period. The fee rate is symmetrically reduced when the fund’s performance
falls short of the benchmark.”); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach
Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 225, 319 (2007) (defining a “fulcrum fee” as a fee in which the manager of a
mutual fund adjusts “ the base advisory fee depending on how the fund performs
relative to a stipulated market index). “The key to the fulcrum fee is that the percentage
charged cannot merely increase when performance exceeds expectations--it must also
decrease proportionately when performance lags.” Id.
203. See supra note 199.
204. JIAN CAI ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, COMPENSATION AND
RISK INCENTIVES IN BANKING AND FINANCE 4 (2010), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-13.pdf (“Bonuses are
often tied to short-term financial performance, typically of the past one to three years.
Thus, this compensation structure tends to reward short-term profits and may have
encouraged ‘short-termism’ at financial institutions.”)
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on tail risk,205 that is, to invest in assets that will bear short-term returns
even if they are likely to be volatile and underperform in the long-run.206
The financial advisers could have long cashed out their bonuses and
retired by the time the tail risk catches up with their investors.207 For the
investors, the tail risk can completely destroy not only all of their shortterm gain, but even the wealth they initially invested into the account.
One way to combat this problem has been proposed vis-à-vis
traders at investment banks (though it need not be limited to this group
of financial professionals) by Professor Raghuram Rajan (“Professor
Rajan”)208 in his book Fault Lines.209 Professor Rajan has proposed that
traders not be given their bonuses in one lump sum at the end of the
year, but rather be paid only a fraction of the bonus they earned based on
that year’s performance.210 Professor Rajan indicates that it would be
better for investors if the bonus was paid out in increments over time

205. A tail risk is a risk with a very small probability of manifesting. It is named a
“tail risk” because its probability is at the tail of a statistical distribution. RAJAN, supra
note 17, at 136-37.
206. Using the example of selling earthquake insurance, Professor Rajan illustrates
how a fund manager’s adoption of tail risk is rewarded. The manager sells earthquake
insurance to buyers seeking to protect themselves from a catastrophic event. In the
short-term, the manager can demonstrate large profits from the incoming insurance
premiums but no losses because an earthquake is a rare occurrence and is thus a longterm risk. The short-term profits are rewarded by superiors within the manager’s fund
or customers seeking to invest with the manager to realize similar profits. Thus, the
manager’s behavior of adopting long-term risk for short-term profit is rewarded. Profits
eventually diminish or disappear altogether when an earthquake does occur and the
manager must pay insurance claims. If the manager did not save the short-term profits
to protect against the long-term risk, the manager will default on the insurance claims.
The manager’s incentive structure rewards short-term success at the expense of
planning for long-term losses. Id. at 138-39.
207. See id. at 139 (explaining that the rewards reaped during periods of short-term
profit are likely to be enough to allow a manager taking on tail risk to live comfortably
in retirement).
208. Raghuram Rajan is the Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of
Finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, a current economic
advisor to the Prime Minister of India, and was Chief Economist at the International
Monetary Fund (2003-2007). See The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business, “Faculty Profile: Raghuram Rajan,” http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/
bio.aspx?person_id=12825569280 (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
209. Rajan, supra note 17, passim.
210. See id. at 164.

2011]

ANOTHER ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATION:
EXPANDING INVESTOR OPPORTUNITY

833

based on the performance of the trader’s positions over time.211
Consequently, if all of the gains in the first year were lost by the end of
the second year, the rest of the bonus would never be paid.212 Of course,
determining the appropriate timeline for such bonus structures would be
a challenge.
Regulators may hesitate, as they should, to set such bonus
structures.213 Such a task should be performed by the market. What
regulators could do, however, is incentivize the private sector to adopt
structures that better incentivize long-term performance. One way to
accomplish this goal is to require blatant disclosure of the incentives of
the financial professional, whether she is a mutual fund manager or other
adviser, to achieve high performance beyond the current year. In this
way, firms may begin to compete more openly based on the incentive
structures they can create and will experiment with different structures
in an effort to compete for investors. This approach would be consistent
with the enhancement of social welfare through addressing a market
failure as it seeks to remedy the information problem of investors not
necessarily being aware of the incentives their financial advisers face.
An opportunities-based policy would go further, perhaps by
mandating that financial institutions establish long-term incentives, such
as the proposal offered by Professor Rajan. An opportunities-based
approach need not prescribe the particular incentives; it need only
mandate that incentives for long-term gains exist.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id.
See Jeremiah Thomas, TARP’s Hard Line on Executive Compensation:
Misaligned Incentives and Constitutional Hurdles, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (2009)
(arguing against the provisions restricting executive compensation in Congress’s
implementation of the Troubled Assets Relief Fund and subsequent legislation). One
negative effect of statutory restrictions on bonus structures is that companies could shift
towards higher salaries in place of performance based structures that can be altered to
meet the financial realities of the current market. Higher salaries would result in higher
fixed costs, and would diminish external incentives to encourage performance. Id. at
1349-50. See also David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus
of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435 (2010). Previous attempts to regulate executive
pay have included the use of tax incentives and mandatory pay disclosure. These
initiatives have achieved mixed success, and often have resulted in unintended
consequences, such as shifting the cost of non-compliance with tax incentives to
shareholders, and in the case of pay disclosure, incentivizing higher bonuses to avoid
giving the appearance that executives were below average, which could undermine
investor confidence. Id. at 451-54.
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In addition to the potential misalignment of time horizons between
investors and their financial advisers, a conflict of interest could arise
between the liquidation incentives of an investor and the financial
advisers upon which she relies. For instance, suppose that a mutual fund
manager is compensated, at least in part, based on the total value of
assets under her management at a particular point in time.214 Suppose
also that the fund specializes in seeking out stocks that are undervalued
based on certain fundamentals, holding them until they rise to provide a
certain percentage return, and then liquidating these positions into a safe
alternative, such as government bonds, to preserve the value gained
while seeking more undervalued equity in which to invest. Now
suppose that the management fee is determined based on the total value
of assets under management at the end of the year.215 A manager may
thus be tempted to hold on to certain positions that she believes are
overvalued in order to benefit from the fee gains at the end of the year.
This decision could turn out to expose her investors to additional risk
and volatility and not gain as much return as they otherwise would have,
as these positions begin to lose value and the manager continues to hold
on to them. Of course, if the manager happens to be very lucky and the
positions do not lose value before she is compensated, this could be a
win-win situation for both her investors and her. Such a scenario,
however, is far from guaranteed.
One way to overcome such perverse incentives is to base
management compensation not on the value of assets at any point in
time, but rather on their average value over a longer time horizon.216 In
214. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE FEES AND EXPENSE RATIOS,
12 FUNDAMENTALS 1, 2 (Aug. 2003) (“Advisory fees are usually computed as a
percentage of fund assets; many funds employ a declining rate structure under which
the percentage fee rate decreases at designated breakpoints as assets increase.”).
Mutual funds generally charge two types of fees: sales loads, a type of brokerage fee to
compensate advisers for particular transactions which are paid either at the time of
purchase or when the shares are redeemed, and fees for ongoing expenses, which are
paid from fund assets and tend to decrease as the fund achieves economies of scale.
Illig, supra note 202, at 320. “Total mutual fund fees – ongoing expenses plus an
annualized portion of any sales loads – decreased from an average of 2.32% of fund
assets in 1980 to 1.07% of fund assets in 2006.” Id.
215. See Dana Anspach, 6 Ways Financial Advisors Charge Fees, ABOUT.COM,
http://moneyover55.about.com (“A typical asset management fee can range from 2.0%
per year on the high side to .50% per year on the low side. Typically the more assets
you have, the lower the fee.”).
216. See Black, supra note 197, at 877 (acknowledging that the incentives of private
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this way, compensation would incentivize long-term stable wealth
creation over short-term gains, which could deprive investors of more
sustainable gains to their portfolios. Consistent with an opportunitiesbased approach, the SEC has recently proposed rules regulating
incentive-based compensation arrangements at financial institutions.217
In particular, the proposed regulations, if adopted, would: (1) require
disclosure to federal regulators of the firm’s incentive-based
compensation arrangements; (2) prohibit incentive-based compensation
arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks; and (3) require
financial institutions with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets
to defer at least 50-percent of any incentive-based compensation for
executive officers for three years.218 Furthermore, under the proposed
rule, deferred compensation would be awarded on a pro rata basis and
would be adjusted for losses incurred by the covered institution after the
compensation’s initial reward.219 While this proposed regulation is
controversial because of its proscriptive nature,220 it provides investors
with the benefit of prioritizing longer-term goals by aligning the
incentives of financial professionals with these goals.
Regulators could further encourage a larger number of institutions
to consider unique fee structures in multiple ways. First, as mentioned
before, they could mandate public disclosure of whether such incentives
do or do not exist. Second, they could require that incentives for longterm performance exist, indicating that a host of options is possible, and
not specifying which measure must be taken. Third, federal regulators
could indicate that during times of crisis, support for banks that do not
have such incentives would be limited. Such a threat would have to be
credible, however, which is difficult given the magnitude of recent bank
bailouts.221 In order to promote wealth creation and account for the
money managers may need to be redirected toward more long-term goals).
217. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (April 14,
2011)(amending 12 CFR 42, 12 CFR 236, 12 CFR 372, 12 CFR 563, 12 CFR 741, 12
CFR 751, 12 CFR 1232, 17 CFR 248).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The proposed rule was approved by the Commission by a 3-2 vote. SEC
Proposes Bonus Restrictions, FINANCIAL ADVISOR (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.famag.com/fa-news/6939-sec-proposes-bonus-restrictions.html.
221. For arguments supporting the ability of bailouts to cause moral hazard, see
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank
Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 828 (2010) (describing a House Republican Bill that
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cognitive limitations of most investors to process the overwhelming
amounts of information with which they are already inundated, some
type of direct mandate for incentives for long-term wealth creation are in
order.

VI. CONCLUSION
This article advocates for the inclusion in the goals of securities
regulation a value that has not heretofore been asserted. Along with
well functioning capital markets,222 efficient capital allocation,223
refused to identify systematically significant institutions because, according to its
sponsors, doing so would represent an express guarantee of a bailout during times of
financial distress and would create “undue moral hazard”); Alison M. Hashmall, After
the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too Big to Fail” Non-Bank Financial
Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 832 (2010) (stating a policy that bails out
institutions deemed “too big to fail” is problematic in that it “creates moral hazard for
the guaranteed parties, who will come to expect future bailouts”); Shelley Smith,
Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2010) (noting that bailouts
used by the government during past financial crises create a moral hazard by “insulating
the bailout recipients from the consequences of the risks they willingly assumed” and
that instead of discouraging excessive risk-taking, put large financial institutions in a
“heads I win, tails you lose” position that justifies engaging in future problematic
conduct); SIGTARP, supra note 97, at 3-4 (“It is useful to analyze any Governmental
intervention in the market like TARP against three distinct types of cost: the financial
cost to the taxpayers; the moral hazard damage to market incentives created by
Government intervention; and . . . the impact on Government credibility due to the
failure to explain what is being done with billions of taxpayer dollars transparently and
forthrightly . . . . Absent meaningful regulatory reform, TARP runs the risk of merely
re-animating markets that had collapsed under the weight of reckless behavior.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 422 (“Our federal securities laws are designed to
protect investors and the integrity of capital markets by mandating disclosure that
enables informed investor decision making, boosts investor confidence, and reduces
agency costs.”); 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48643 (“Section 3(f) of
the Exchange Act requires the Commission, whenever it engages in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, to consider whether the action would promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.”).
223. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 424 (“The federal securities laws promote market
efficiency by requiring that information be made available to the market for investment
decisions.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 713 (“[S]cholarly analysis of
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combating market failures,224 and other goals that have been advocated
by legal scholars and policy makers, securities regulation should also
seek to expand opportunities for wealth accumulation, particularly for
the majority of our society, which has a small proportion of our nation’s
wealth.225 In considering how to promote this goal, I take an
interdisciplinary approach to illustrate the ways in which current policies
do not adequately promote opportunities for wealth accumulation.
First, I note that a regulatory approach that creates blatant divisions
between groups creates cycles of entitlements and perceptions of
unfairness that could delegitimize democratic government.226 At the
same time, I advocate for a better understanding of how perceived
differences in access empirically impact different groups of investors.
Second, I look to the research in psychology and behavioral economics
to evaluate how investors respond to the SEC’s current dominant
approach toward regulation of mandating disclosures.227 This analysis
shows that the current approach is inadequate in reducing inequities and
may, in fact, be exacerbating inequities between those who are
sophisticated and can afford assistance to absorb massive amounts of
information and those who cannot. Third, I also look to the behavioral
economics literature to evaluate where regulation can help investors

securities regulation must proceed on the assumption that the ultimate goal of securities
regulation is to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of
resources in the economy.”); 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77.
224. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 525 (Regulation . . . may be justified when a
market suffers from such structural imperfections—so-called market failures.”);
Beville, Falaschetti, & Orlando, supra note 1, at 859-60 (arguing that regulation does
better than the free market from a social welfare perspective when transaction costs are
high).
225. See Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and the
Problem of Wealth, 67 MD. L. REV. 123, 124 (2007) (“[In 2005] [t]he top 1 percent
control[led] 38.1 percent of the country’s wealth, while the bottom 90 percent
control[led] 29 percent of the country’s wealth.”); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic
Analysis: Inequality, Populism, and Democratic Tax Policy, 114 TAX NOTES 16, 17-18
(2007) (“[In 2004,] [t]he least wealthy 50 percent of households held only 2.5 percent
of the nation’s wealth. Meanwhile, the wealthiest 10 percent held nearly 70 percent.”);
Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 658 (2010)
(“[In 2007,] the wealthiest five percent of the nation’s households collectively own[ed]
sixty percent of the nation’s wealth. Collectively, the top half of the population own[ed]
ninety-seven percent of the overall wealth.”).
226. See supra Part II.
227. See supra Part III.
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mitigate their own behavioral biases, which inhibit them from acting in
ways that are ultimately in their best interest.228 Regulatory policy can
give “nudges” without taking choice away from investors to help them
maintain and grow their wealth more effectively.229
Finally, I apply the research of financial economists to examine the
implications of how financial professionals are compensated given that
the principal agent problem impacts the majority of investors because
they delegate their investing decisions.230 This research demonstrates
that the incentives of investment professionals do not always align with
the long-term goals of investors, making it more difficult for investors to
retain and grow their wealth.231 I provide suggestions for how regulators
might induce the private sector to restructure the incentives of money
managers, traders, and other investment professionals.232
An opportunities-based approach, which would promote wealth
accumulation for a greater proportion of society, is likely to result in a
more long-term approach to investing. Such an approach could have
systemic benefits, making investors less prone to bubbles and bursts.233
The positive externalities of taking an opportunities-based approach are
not to be underestimated. Promoting more stable, long-term investing
could lead to wealth creation that incentivizes more saving and
investment, creating a positive feedback loop of wealth creation for
many who, to date, have been unable to benefit from the tremendous
opportunities for investment and wealth creation in our society.
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